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COMMENT
A NEW ARGUMENT FOR THE NEXT KAHLER V. KANSAS: DUE
PROCESS DEMANDS MORE THAN COGNITIVE CAPACITY
Matthew Hughes†
“[A] condition of all others the most afflictive and humiliating—that of
HUMAN NATURE IN RUINS.”1—George Dale Collinson
“[R]eason is not driven from her seat, but distraction sits down upon it along
with her, holds her, trembling, upon it, and frightens her from her
propriety.”2—Lord Thomas Erskine
I. INTRODUCTION3
During the weekend after Thanksgiving in 2009, James Kraig Kahler shot
his wife, his two daughters, and his wife’s grandmother.4 Ten years later, the
United States Supreme Court agreed to hear his case and resolve, as a matter
of constitutional law, a question that gripped the American public forty years
ago: Can the government punish a person who is incapable of discerning
between good and evil?5
†
Matthew Hughes is a third-year JD candidate at Liberty University School of Law.
Special thanks are due to Professors Scott Thompson and Rena Lindevaldsen, who coached
me for the moot court tournament in which I originally encountered Kahler v. Kansas and
its seemingly intractable historico-legal problem. Their probing questions forced me to
develop this argument. To my parents—who forced me to learn how to teach myself—I owe
the habit developed by my dad’s favorite response to my questions: “Look it up.” I am also
deeply grateful to my late grandfather, Ralph Head Smith, who passed on to me his undying
love of the past.
1
1 GEORGE DALE COLLINSON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW CONCERNING IDEOTS, LUNATICS,
AND PERSONS NON COMPOTES MENTIS vii (1812).
2
Hadfield’s Case, 27 How. St. Tr. 1281, 1313 (1800).
3
On publishing this article, my thoughts—although only relevant if somebody actually
reads and uses it—are those of Benjamin Rush in 1812:
In entering upon the subject of the following Inquiries and Observations,
I feel as if I were about to tread upon consecrated ground. I am aware of
its difficulty and importance, and I thus humbly implore that BEING,
whose government extends to the thoughts of all creatures, so to direct
mine, in this arduous undertaking, that nothing hurtful to my fellow
citizens may fall from my pen, and that this work may be the means of
lessening a portion of some of the greatest evils of human life.
BENJAMIN RUSH, MEDICAL INQUIRIES AND OBSERVATIONS UPON THE DISEASES OF THE MIND 9
(1812).
4
Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1026–27 (2020).
5
Id. at 1024; see infra Section II.E.
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The Kansas Supreme Court said yes twenty years ago in State v. Bethel6
and reaffirmed its view in early 2018 when it affirmed Kahler’s murder
convictions.7 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari in
early 2019.8 Kahler argued that the Due Process Clause required Kansas to
allow him to prove his innocence by demonstrating that his mental
disturbance deprived him of the ability to realize that his actions were
immoral.9 The Court affirmed Kahler’s conviction 6-3, holding that the Due
Process Clause does not require the states to acquit defendants whose moral
faculties were inhibited by a mental disturbance at the time of the crime.10
Mr. Kahler’s legal battle is far from over. He almost certainly file a motion
in state court for post-conviction relief and might also file a federal habeas
corpus petition.11 This article articulates the argument Kahler should have
made at the Supreme Court and raised in his state motion for post-conviction
relief,12 and one with which future mentally disturbed homicide defendants
might win where Kahler lost. In light of the Kahler decision, I make an
argument for the next Kahler v. Kansas—whether brought by Mr. Kahler in
post-conviction proceedings or by another mentally disturbed homicide
defendant. I argue that although the Due Process Clause does not prohibit
states from convicting defendants who are unable to distinguish right from

6

State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 851 (Kan. 2003).
State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105, 125 (Kan. 2018).
8
Kahler v. Kansas, 139 S. Ct. 1318, 1318 (2019).
9
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1024–25; Brief for Petitioner at 15–16, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct.
1021 (2020) (No. 18-6135) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioner]; see State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105,
124–25 (Kan. 2018).
10
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1024–25.
11
See generally Matthew Hughes, Comment, Evidentiary Issues and Certificates of
Appealability in Federal Habeas Corpus Petitions, 14 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 487, 490–506 (2020);
see also Andrew P. Lopiano, Comment, Dumplings Instead of Flowers: The Need for a Caseby-Case Approach to FRCP 60(b)(6) Motions Predicated on a Change in Habeas Corpus Law,
15 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 111, (2020).
12
Kahler will undoubtedly raise as many arguments as possible, but his due process
argument is doomed in federal court if the state courts reject it in post-conviction
proceedings because the federal habeas statute requires federal courts to deny relief unless
the state court decision “resulted either in a decision contrary to or involving an
unreasonable application of clearly established [f]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States, or in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the [s]tate court proceeding.” Hughes, supra note
11, at 494–95 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)).
7
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wrong, it prohibits them from restricting the insanity excuse doctrine13 as
narrowly as Kansas has. In words explained and defended below, the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution—as interpreted by the
Supreme Court—requires an insanity excuse that is broader than cognitive
incapacity because cognitive capacity is not the only mental prerequisite to
criminal responsibility. The American legal system has not recognized a
single insanity test as the only right test, nor has it uniformly affirmed the
moral incapacity test as an essential component of a correct insanity test, but
until recently, it wholly rejected the idea that the cognitive incapacity test was
sufficient.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

A Few Caveats

A few caveats are in order. This article addresses only the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Kahler based his claim on both the Kansas and federal constitutions’ due
process provisions,14 but the United States Supreme Court could grant
certiorari only on the federal due process claim.15 The Court also dismissed
Kahler’s Eighth Amendment claim as waived.16 Scholars have raised other
13

The phrase “insanity excuse doctrine” is my own invention. I devised it to circumvent
the confusion that arises from using the phrase “insanity defense” in discussions regarding
the appropriate burden of proof and procedural issues. See infra Section II.C.
14
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1027; State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105, 124 (2018); see generally,
JEFFREY SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018) (urging lawyers to raise and judges to address separate and
distinct state constitutional claims). The Kansas Constitution does not have a due process
clause, but Sections 1 and 2 of its Bill of Rights are equal protection provisions which are
“given much the same effect” as the federal Due Process Clause. Manzanares v. Bell, 522 P.2d
1291, 1302–03 (Kan. 1974). But Kansas courts have interpreted Section 1 more broadly than
the federal courts have interpreted the federal Due Process Clause. Farley v. Engelken, 740
P.2d 1058 (Kan. 1987). In 2019, the Kansas Supreme Court expressly stated that Section 1
“acknowledges rights that are distinct from and broader than the United States
Constitution.” Hodes & Nauser v. Schmidt, 440 P.3d 461, 471 (Kan. 2019).
15
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (“Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a
State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of
certiorari where . . . a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being
repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States.”). Addressing the
corresponding protections in every state and territory is an arduous task outside the scope of
this article, but each state’s protection deserves special attention. SUTTON, supra note 14,
passim.
16
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1027 n.4. Others have discussed the Eighth Amendment argument
for the insanity excuse. See, e.g., Stephen M. LeBlanc, Comment, Cruelty to the Mentally Ill:
An Eighth Amendment Challenge to the Abolition of the Insanity Defense, 56 AM. U.L. REV.
1281 (2007).
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arguments for the insanity defense or a particular version of it,17 but this
article addresses only the federal due process argument.
The practice of criminal law—especially constitutional criminal law—is
not about getting the guilty off on technicalities. It is about convicting the
guilty and only the guilty. It is about the rule of law. It is about refusing to
punish someone if the sentence or conviction, or the process by which they
were obtained, violates our common values. It is about giving everyone the
same protections we would want if we were accused of a crime. This article
addresses the scope of the current protections granted to all American
criminal defendants under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Kahler’s claim was based on the Court’s substantive due process
framework. I have grave misgivings about this framework,18 but the Court
has adopted it. This article presents the best argument Kahler could have
made in the context of the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence.

17
E.g. Michael L. Perlin, “God Said to Abraham/Kill Me a Son”: Why the Insanity Defense
and the Incompetency Statutes are Compatible with and Required by the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Basic Principles of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 54 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 477 (2017). The United States signed the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities, but never ratified it. CRPD and Optional Protocol Signatures and
Ratifications, UNITED NATIONS (May 2016),
https://www.un.org/disabilities/documents/2016/Map/DESA-Enable_4496R6_May16.jpg.
18
The idea that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment contains
substantive guarantees has little support in the amendment’s legislative history. Paul J.
Larkin, Jr. & GianCarlo Canaparo, Are Criminals Bad or Mad? Premeditated Murder, Mental
Illness, and Kahler v. Kansas, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 85, 110–11 (2020). But see Timothy
Sandefur, Privileges, Immunities, and Substantive Due Process, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 115,
147–56 (2010). Legislative history is important because our government derives its powers
from the consent of the governed as expressed through their elected representatives, and
legislative history is one of the best guides to interpreting those representatives’ expressions
of consent as embodied in written law. See David Schoenbrod, Consent of the Governed: A
Constitutional Norm that the Court Should Substantially Enforce, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
213, 223 (2020). In practice, the framework also invites each judge to make a legal ruling
based on political or moral opinions rather than an objective, reasonably certain standard.
See infra note 633.
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This is a legal argument, not a philosophical or theological argument,19 not
even a moral one.20 It is certainly not a medical argument.21 Because the law
determines the categories of insanity that are legally relevant, medical
expertise helps gather evidence in particular cases and informs policymakers,
but it does not dictate legally and morally significant categories of mental
diseases and defects. Morality, theology, and philosophy inform legal reform
advocates and lawmakers, but they do not have a place in the interpretation
of the law outside of ascertaining the intent of the legislators.
This is a nuanced argument that is difficult to articulate but fairly easy to
support from the historical record and the Court’s precedents. Kahler’s
lawyers should have realized that their argument had serious inconsistencies
that at least five justices would reject.22 This argument gives the next Kahler
a chance to raise the due process argument.
This argument is not so much about what the law is or should be as much
as it is about what the law might be. It is an argument that several justices
hinted at during the Kahler oral argument but was never articulated for the

19
The major modern religious traditions harbor debates and discussions about fault and
moral responsibility and how a proper view of fault and moral responsibility should inform
public policy. In my own tradition, evangelical Protestantism, and in Christendom generally,
the doctrines of total depravity and human responsibility complicate the debate. The Mosaic
law does not expressly mention any insanity excuse. However, some passages in the Bible tie
mental states to moral responsibility and the severity of punishment. See, e.g., Luke 12:35–48
(ESV) (“And that servant who knew his master’s will but did not get ready or act according
to his will, will receive a severe beating. But the one who did not know, and did what
deserved a beating, will receive a light beating. Everyone to whom much was given, of him
much will be required, and from him to whom they entrusted much, they will demand the
more.”).
20
Others have raised moral arguments. E.g., Mark Hathway, Comment, The Moral
Significance of the Insanity Defense, 73 J. CRIM. L. 310 (2009).
21
Brief for the American Bar Association at 8–9, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020)
(No. 18-6135) (citing ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 323–24 (1989))
[hereinafter ABA Brief]; Transcript of Oral Argument at 8–9, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct.
1021 (2020) (No. 18-6135) (recording Kahler’s attorney conceding that the legal concepts are
distinct from any medical diagnosis) [hereinafter Transcript].
22
Justice Kagan’s opinion kindly chalked it up to faulty reasoning, but I find it hard to
believe Kahler’s lawyers could not see the shortcomings of their position. They ultimately
made a foredoomed argument to win the moral incapacity excuse for all time instead of
making a much more plausible argument for a less ambitious ruling, which they could have
won with the argument this article makes. I believe a less ambitious ruling would have been
both more plausible to the justices and laid the groundwork for bigger wins in future cases.
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Court or explained as an alternative basis to rule for Kahler.23 It is also about
a vast quantity of historical evidence not included in any of the briefs.
Criminal responsibility is distinct from other reasons for confining the
mentally ill.24 People whose mental disturbances make them dangerous to
themselves or others must be restrained.25 Others may merit confinement by
committing a crime for which they can be justly held accountable.26 It is also
separate from the issue of competency to stand trial and the wisdom of “guilty
but mentally ill” statutes that provide for punishment and treatment in
tandem.27 The subject addressed here is simply mental prerequisites to
criminal responsibility.
This argument is a legal argument based on history. It is a historico-legal
argument, if you will. Because history is essential to the argument, I quote
freely and sometimes at length from the original sources. Although to some
extent the argument depends on my characterization of the materials on
which I draw, I have attempted to retain enough of the original writings to
allow readers to decide for themselves whether the sources say what I argue
they say.28
The insanity defense—or, as I refer to it here, the insanity excuse
doctrine29—is complex and confusing. Interlocking concepts make it difficult
to sort out one facet of legal insanity without first clarifying another. That
concept, in turn, requires a hard look at yet another facet to fully
understand.30 The remainder of Part II sorts out the most difficult aspects of
the insanity excuse.

23
Transcript, supra note 21, at 57 (“[T]here’s just a ton [in the history] that suggests
that . . . there was something more than a requirement that the defendant . . . be able to form
an intent to kill.”); see infra notes 140–143, 145 and accompanying text.
24
Norval Morris, The Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Ill, 33 SYR. L. REV. 477, 478
(1982).
25
Id.
26
Id. at 477–78.
27
Id. at 480, 482.
28
This keeps me honest and enables you, the reader, to make a much more informed
conclusion without having to look up the sources for yourself.
29
See infra Section II.C.2.
30
Confusion is rampant and apt to cause “injustice and inefficiency.” Morris, supra note
24, at 478. Professor Morris also argued that the fundamentally incompatible language and
thinking of the fields of law and psychiatry—not the least of these being the chasm between
individuals to be convicted and punished or acquitted and released, and those with mental
health issues to be treated—render the insanity excuse’s problems acute. Id. at 500–01.
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Variations on the Insanity Theme

Every state has some version of the insanity excuse.31 Despite differences
in phraseology, these defenses boil down to one or more of the four basic
insanity tests laid out in Clark v. Arizona.32 Three of these defenses
correspond to the three major types of mental incapacity. The types of mental
incapacity are primarily based on legal, rather than medical, concepts and are
focused on the resulting mental deficiency rather than the underlying
psychological or physiological causes.33
The first type of mental incapacity is cognitive incapacity: the inability to
appreciate the nature and quality of one’s acts.34 A person suffering from
cognitive incapacity might mistake choking the victim to death for squeezing
a lemon. Evidence that a particular defendant’s mental disturbance made the
defendant think the victim was an alien, for example, would defeat the mens
rea required to prove intentional murder.35
The second is moral incapacity: the inability to appreciate the
wrongfulness of one’s conduct.36 There are two sub-types of moral incapacity.
Depending on the jurisdiction, those suffering from moral incapacity are, by
reason of a mental defect, either deprived of the moral inhibitions most
people experience—best termed pure moral incapacity—or are unable to
31

See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at Addendum.
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749–53 (2006).
33
See id. at 752; Stephen J. Morse & Richard J. Bonnie, Abolition of the Insanity Defense
Violates Due Process, 41 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 488, 489 (2013); Arlie Laughnan,
Mental Incapacity Doctrines in Criminal Law, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2012)
(“Although it might be thought to describe a condition or set of conditions, in criminal law,
the term ‘mental incapacity’ refers to the consequences of certain conditions.”).
34
See Clark, 548 U.S. at 753. Morris suggests that these tests are hopelessly philosophical:
Lawyers have been quite content to strap a mattress to the back of any
psychiatrist willing to appear in court to answer questions like: At the
time of the killing, did the accused “know that nature and quality of the
act?”; did he “know that it was wrong?”; did he have “substantial capacity
to appreciate the criminality of his conduct?”; [and] did he have
“substantial capacity to control his conduct?” Wiser psychiatrists and
those not tempted by the bright focus of public interests have avoided
these philosophically impossible questions. Nor does it assist materially
to direct the psychiatrist to give information to the jury to help it to
answer these elusive questions but to avoid offering answers because it is
the questions themselves that are philosophically in error, pretending to
a precision beyond present knowledge.
Morris, supra note 24, at 502–03 (footnote omitted).
35
See infra Section II.C.1.
36
Clark, 548 U.S. at 750; see Robert M. Ireland, Insanity and the Unwritten Law, 32 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 157, 165–67 (1988).
32
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understand that society views certain conduct as harmful and has forbidden
it by law—which I shall refer to as legal-moral incapacity.37 Cognitive
incapacity always results in moral incapacity, because the inability to
distinguish between a lemon and a human neck entails an inability to discern
that crushing the neck is wrong.38 While such a person might know in the
abstract that crushing someone’s neck is wrong, the person lacks the capacity
to discern the moral implications of his conduct because of an inability to
accurately understand what he is doing.
The third is volitional incapacity: an inability to control one’s acts, or as it
is often stated, an inability to conform one’s conduct to the requirements of
law.39 The irresistible impulse test is the quintessential version of the
volitional incapacity excuse.40 In early Anglo-American law, cognitive
incapacity and moral incapacity were deemed significant because they
signified defects of volition that rendered criminal choices neither free nor
truly blameworthy.41
The fourth insanity test is called the Durham test or the product-ofinsanity test.42 Under this insanity defense, a person cannot be held
responsible for his criminal conduct if his conduct was the product of mental
illness or defect.43 The Durham test inherently allows the jury to consider
whether a mental defect or disease so distorted the defendant’s cognitive,
37

See, e.g., State v. Wilson, 700 A.2d 633, 639–41 (Conn. 1997).
See Clark, 548 U.S. at 750 nn.11–12.
39
Id. at 750 n.12.
40
Benjamin B. Sendor, Crimes as Communication: An Interpretive Theory of the Insanity
Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1383 (1986); see Parsons v.
State, 2 So. 854 (Ala. 1887).
41
Id. at 1373 (“From Bracton in the thirteenth century through Blackstone in the
eighteenth century, English commentators adopted Aristotle’s identification of the capacities
of cognition and volition as the twin bases of justification for excuses in their explanation of
the exculpatory character of insanity.”).
42
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 1954), abrogated by United
States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 981–82 (D.C. Cir. 1972). New Hampshire’s insanity test is
very similar: “a mental disease or defect caused his actions.” State v. Fichera, 903 A.2d 1030,
1034 (N.H. 2006) (emphasis added) (citing State v. Abbott, 503 A.2d 791, 794 (N.H. 1985)).
New Hampshire’s test has been distinguished from the Durham test, most prominently by
pointing out that insanity is a question of fact for the jury and there is no specific test as a
matter of law. Id. at 1035 (citations omitted); see John Reid, Understanding the New
Hampshire Doctrine of Criminal Insanity, 69 YALE L.J. 367, 378–79 (1960) (citations
omitted); see also Brian E. Elkins, Idaho’s Repeal of the Insanity Defense: What Are We Trying
to Prove?, 31 IDAHO L. REV. 151, 153 (1994) (“Maybe that is the answer—that we cannot
neatly define what mens rea means but rather, the issue must be decided by a fact finder after
applying the current understandings of psychiatry and psychology and current social mores
to a definition of responsibility.”).
43
Clark, 548 U.S. at 749–50; Fichera, 903 A.2d at 1034.
38
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moral, or volitional capacity as to render the crime a result of the defect or
disease rather than the defendant’s mental processes.
The insanity tests of most United States jurisdictions today consist of
cognitive incapacity and at least one other form of incapacity.44 The famous
M’Naghten test includes two prongs: cognitive incapacity and moral
incapacity.45 The insanity defense of the Model Penal Code, first published in
1962 and currently in force in fourteen states, includes the moral and
volitional incapacity defenses.46 A few states, including Kansas, have adopted
the mens rea approach.47 The mens rea approach does away with the
affirmative insanity defense but allows evidence of cognitive incapacity to
defeat the mens rea element, or makes evidence of insanity that affects the
defendant’s ability to form the requisite mens rea element an affirmative
defense—in either case, the focus is on the “intent element” of the crime.”48
Other insanity excuse formulations have also been proposed.49
C.

Excuse Me
1.

Mens Rea

All crimes have an actus reus element and almost all have a mens rea
element. The mens rea element is the mental state, and the actus reus is a
voluntary act. Only a willed bodily movement can satisfy the actus reus
element.50 The mens rea element of the crime is whatever mental state the
crime requires.51 For instance, in South Carolina, “[m]urder is the killing of
any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied.”52 Malice is
44
Clark, 548 U.S. at 749–52. Although the Clark Court said that 11 states have adopted
the moral incapacity defense as their insanity defense, the insanity excuse in those states also
includes cognitive incapacity by virtue of the mens rea element of the crime. See infra Section
II.C.
45
Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 72 (Nev. 2001).
46
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (AM. L. INST. 1962).
47
State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 851 (Kan. 2003).
48
See id.
49
See Helen Silving, The Criminal Law of Mental Incapacity, 53 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY
& POLICE SCI. 129, 129 (1962) (“No punishment shall be imposed upon a person if at the time
of engaging in criminal conduct and for some time prior thereto his ego functioning was so
impaired that he had a very considerably greater mental difficulty in complying with social
demands and rules than does the majority of the members of the community.”).
50
E.g., People v. Grant, 377 N.E.2d 4, 8-9 (Ill. 1978) (noting that the actus reus element
cannot be satisfied by a bodily movement caused by something other than a person’s
conscious will, including “convulsions, sleep, unconsciousness, hypnosis or seizures.”).
51
See Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in
the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 673–75 (1993).
52
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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simply the “wrongful intent” to kill.53 Malice is express if it is admitted in
words and implied when it can be inferred from the circumstances.54 In a
murder case, the prosecution must produce enough evidence—either
through the defendant’s statements or other circumstances—to persuade the
jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant maliciously intended to
kill the victim. A defendant can challenge the prosecution on the malice
element in two ways. First, a defendant can present evidence that contradicts
or counteracts the prosecution’s evidence and thereby give the jury room to
reasonably doubt wrongful intent—the mens rea element. Second, a
defendant can raise an affirmative defense of insanity, which typically
requires proof to a preponderance of the evidence.55
2.

The Insanity Excuse Doctrine

Kahler and his amici spoke much of “the insanity defense” and “the
affirmative defense of insanity,”56 but the burden of proof is irrelevant and
Kahler should have framed his argument in terms of an insanity excuse
doctrine.57 In Leland v. Oregon and Clark v. Arizona, the Supreme Court
made it abundantly clear that states may set the burden of proof for the
insanity “defense” as they see fit.58 States may also forbid defendants from
using expert opinion testimony to support an affirmative insanity defense.59
The Clark Court distinguished proving an affirmative insanity defense from
challenging the prosecution’s proof of mens rea and from defeating a
statutory presumption of sanity.60 As Justice Kavanaugh clarified at oral
53
State v. Oates, 803 S.E.2d 911, 921 (S.C. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting In re Tracy B., 704
S.E.2d 71, 80 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010)); see State v. Friend, 281 S.E.2d 106, 107 (S.C. 1981).
54
Friend, 281 S.E.2d at 106–07; Oates, 803 S.E.2d at 921; see State v. Fields, 214 S.E.2d
320, 322 (S.C. 1975).
55
E.g., State v. Finley, 290 S.E.2d 808, 810 (S.C. 1982) (citing State v. Bolton, 223 S.E.2d
863 (S.C. 1976)).
56
E.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 12, 15, 23, 28, 36; ABA Brief, supra note 21, at
6; Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union at 2, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020)
(No. 18-6135); Brief for Criminal Law and Mental Health Law Professors at 2, 4, Kahler v.
Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020) (No. 18-6135); Brief for Legal Historians and Sociologists at 3,
Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020) (No. 18-6135).
57
The argument that abolishing the insanity defense violates due process is equivalent to
the argument that the mens rea approach is not broad enough. See Morse & Bonnie, supra
note 33, at 489, 491.
58
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 770–73 (2006); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798–99
(1952) (upholding an Oregon law that required defendants to prove insanity beyond a
reasonable doubt).
59
Clark, 548 U.S. at 757–61, 769–78.
60
Id. at 766–69; see supra Section II.C.1; see also Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651, 655–56
(Alaska Ct. App. 1985).
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argument in Kahler, states that have adopted the mens rea approach “haven’t
necessarily abolished the insanity defense. . . . They have funneled it into
mens rea.”61
The phrases “insanity defense” and “affirmative insanity defense” breed
confusion by failing to acknowledge Leland, Clark, and several other key
cases.62 In light of those cases, the fundamental question is not what the
burden of proof must be,63 but whether states can wholly dispense with
insanity—or a particular insanity test—as a means of negating criminal
responsibility. The term “excuse,” which has the virtue of not being
associated with a particular burden of proof,64 refers to a defense which, if
proved, does not make the act a morally upright act but “negate[s]
responsibility.”65 Therefore, I use the term insanity excuse doctrine to refer to
the notion that insanity, regardless of the test or tests adopted in a given
61

Transcript, supra note 21, at 21; see Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1029 (“Kansas, [Kahler] then
contends, has altogether ‘abolished the insanity defense,’ in disregard of hundreds of years of
historical practice. . . . [but] [h]is central claim . . . is more confined. It is that Kansas has
impermissibly jettisoned the moral-incapacity test for insanity.”); see also Gardner, supra
note 51, at 640–41 (distinguishing between a proposed first level of mens rea based upon the
definition of the crime and a second level functioning as an excuse).
62
See, e.g., Jean K. Gilles Phillips & Rebecca Woodman, The Insanity of the Mens Rea
Model: Due Process and the Abolition of the Insanity Defense, 28 PACE L. REV. 455, 459–61,
486–88 (2008). A recent law review article stated that Alaska abolished the insanity defense,
but Alaska has instead limited the affirmative insanity defense to cognitive incapacity. R.
Michael Shoptaw, Comment, M’Naghten is a Fundamental Right: Why Abolishing the
Traditional Insanity Defense Violates Due Process, 84 MISS. L.J. 1101, 1105 (2015) (citations
omitted); see infra note 78 and accompanying text. The other key cases regarding mens rea,
defenses, and burdens of proof are Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (plurality
opinion), and Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality opinion).
63
Even those who argue against Clark for the M’Naghten rule as guaranteed by due
process admit that states may vary the burden of proof to the defendant’s disadvantage. See
Shoptaw, supra note 62, at 1131–32.
64
See Joshua Dressler, Foreword, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the
Concepts and the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1172 (1987).
65
Brief for Philosophy Professors at 3, Kahler v. Kansas 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020) (No. 186136) (citing J. L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address, 57 PROCS.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 1, 2 (1956)); see Arnold N. Enker, In support of the Distinction Between
Justification and Excuse, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 273, 274 (2009) (quoting Joshua Dressler,
Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model Penal Code,
19 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 675–76 (1988)); Marcia Baron, Justifications and Excuses, 2 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 387, 389–90 (2005); Dressler, supra note 64, at 1162–63, 1165–67; see also Sanford H.
Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 258 (1987) (“The other ground for asserting my
innocence is excuse. Here, again, I deny my culpability even while admitting the criminal
harm, but not, as before [with justification], because I did the right thing after all. Rather, I
argue, some disability in my freedom to choose the right makes it inappropriate to punish
me.”); Francis A. Allen, The Rule of the American Law Institute’s Model Penal Code, 45
MARQ. L. REV. 494, 496–97 (1962) (citation omitted).
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jurisdiction, is sufficient ground for absolving a defendant from criminal
responsibility.66
D.

Substantive Due Process

The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause to prohibit the states from defining crimes and establishing
criminal procedures in ways that “offend[] principle[s] of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”67
It also prohibits state action contrary to principles that are “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty,”68 but the Court’s insanity jurisprudence
precludes a decision in Kahler’s favor based on this test.69 Fundamental
liberty interests, which must be articulated precisely, are founded upon these
fundamental or implicit principles and may be interfered with only by
government action “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”70
E.

Insanity Excuse Reform

Popular outrage followed John Hinckley, Jr’s trial and acquittal for
attempting to assassinate President Ronald Reagan.71 Unaware of the
nuances of the insanity defense and criminal procedure, Americans tended
to believe the insanity defense was a golden opportunity to abuse the
system.72 A study of public perception shortly after the Hinckley trial found
66

See Sendor, supra note 40, at 1371; Marina Angel, Substantive Due Process and the
Criminal Law, 9 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 77 n.61 (1977).
67
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1977) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
68
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (citing Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937)).
69
Although the Court’s Due Process precedents are unfavorable, there is a compelling
argument that the Court’s Eighth Amendment juvenile and mental illness cases, combined
with a few key substantive due process cases, allow the Court to conclude that the moral
incapacity excuse is implicitly in the concept of ordered liberty. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48 (2010) (holding that life without parole for “third strike” probation violation was
cruel and unusual); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (holding that the death penalty is
cruel and unusual when imposed on juveniles); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(holding it cruel and unusual to execute a mentally ill offender).
70
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
71
State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359, 361 (Utah 1995); Valeri P. Hans & Dan Slater, John
Hinckley, Jr. and the Insanity Defense: the Public’s Verdict, 47 PUB. OP. Q. 202, 202–03 (1983);
Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
777, 779 (1985); Phillips & Woodman, supra note 62, at 485 (citations omitted); Raymond L.
Spring, Farewell to Insanity: A Return to Mens Rea, 66 J. KAN. B. ASS’N 38, 43 (1997); John
Hinckley Jr., BIOGRAPHY (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.biography.com/crime-figure/johnhinckley-jr.
72
Hans & Slater, supra note 71, at 205–07.
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87% percent of Americans believed that “the insanity defense is a loophole
that allows too many guilty people to go free.”73
In response, several states abolished the moral incapacity excuse in favor
of the mens rea approach, leaving only the cognitive incapacity excuse.
Montana made the change in 1979,74 before the failed assassination. Utah
changed in 1983,75 Kansas and Nevada in 1995,76 and Idaho in 1996.77 In 1982,
Alaska abolished the moral incapacity excuse and made cognitive incapacity
an affirmative defense.78 In 1981 and 1982, about twenty states reconsidered
their insanity defenses.79 Congress considered abolishing the moral
incapacity excuse in 1984, but ultimately passed a statute defining the federal
affirmative insanity defense to include both moral and cognitive incapacity.80
F.

State and Federal Insanity Jurisprudence

Several early state decisions upheld the insanity defense as a right under
state or federal constitutional provisions or both.81 In 1910, the Washington
Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction because the defendant had
been denied his right to due process and a jury trial under the Washington

73

Id. at 207. Professor Morris argued that when it comes to mentally disturbed offenders,
“[w]e are at the same time more forgiving and more fearful, less punitive and more selfprotective.” Morris, supra note 24, at 480.
74
State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 996–97 (Mont. 1984).
75
Herrera, 895 P.2d at 361 (citing State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 383 (Utah 1993); Utah
Legislative Survey, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 115, 151 (1984)).
76
State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 844 (Kan. 2003) (quoting Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3220 (2006),
repealed, 2011 Kan. Sess. Laws 556–57). The statute took effect on January 1, 1996. Id.
77
1996 Idaho Sess. Laws 737–38 (codified at Idaho Code § 18-207); Finger v. State, 27
P.3d 66, 70 (Nev. 2001).
78
ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (2020); State v. Patterson, 740 P.2d 944, 945, 949 (Alaska
1987); Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651, 657 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (citations omitted).
79
Elkins, supra note 42, at 155.
80
Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 20, 98 Stat. 2057 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 17). The federal insanity defense now reads as follows:
(a) Affirmative Defense.—It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution
under any Federal statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts
constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental
disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the
wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise
constitute a defense.
(b) Burden of Proof.—The defendant has the burden of proving the
defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence.
18 U.S.C. § 17.
81
See supra, Section II.B.
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State Constitution.82 In 1931, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the
state legislature had violated the Mississippi State Constitution’s due process
provision by abolishing insanity as a defense to murder.83 Several of the
Mississippi justices also relied on federal due process arguments.84 The
Nevada Supreme Court held that the 1995 Nevada statute violated the
Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments,85 but the high courts of Alaska, Idaho,
Kansas, Montana, and Utah sanctioned their respective states’ reforms.86
Federal courts upheld the new federal insanity excuse law against
constitutional challenges.87
Before and after the Hinckley stir, the Supreme Court issued a series of
rulings that all but foreclosed the argument Kahler made in October 2019. In
Leland v. Oregon in 1952, the Supreme Court considered the case of a
mentally disturbed man who brutally murdered a teenage girl.88 Oregon law
required the defendant to prove the affirmative defense of insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence.89 The Supreme Court ruled that since the
prosecutor had to prove the defendant’s cognitive capacity beyond a
reasonable doubt in order to establish the mens rea element, it did not matter
that the defendant had the burden of proof on Oregon’s affirmative insanity
defense.90 This seminal case stands for the proposition that states have wide
latitude in defining claims and defenses, but it did not set out the boundaries
of that discretion.
Powell v. Texas involved intoxication and the Eighth Amendment, not
insanity and substantive due process.91 Noting that Robinson v. California
had struck down a statute “making it a crime to be addicted” to drugs, the
Powell Court nevertheless held that states have broad discretion in
criminalizing conduct despite claims that such conduct results from mental

82

State v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020, 1025 (Wash. 1910) (en banc).
Sinclair v. State, 132 So. 581, 582 (Miss. 1931) (per curiam).
84
Id. (McGowen, J., concurring); id. at 582–83, 588 (Ethridge, J., concurring). Justice
Ethridge believed the statute also violated other provisions of the Mississippi Constitution.
85
Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66 (Nev. 2001).
86
State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 919 (Idaho 1990); State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 852 (Kan.
2003); State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 1002 (Mont. 1984); State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359 (Utah
1995).
87
E.g. United States v. Amos, 803 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that placing the
burden of proving insanity by clear and convincing evidence was constitutional).
88
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 792 (1952).
89
Id. at 795–96.
90
Id.
91
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality opinion).
83
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disturbance or malfunction rather than true choice.92 The Court repudiated
the idea of defining a specific, constitutionally required insanity test,93 stating:
the doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake,
justification, and duress have historically provided the tools
for a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between
the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious,
moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of
man. This process of adjustment has always been thought to
be the province of the States.94
Montana v. Egelhoff involved an intoxicated murderer who sought to
prove that he lacked the mens rea required for murder by proving that his
blood-alcohol content not long after the murder was an astonishing .36.95
Montana law forbade defendants from introducing evidence of voluntary
intoxication to negate the mens rea element of the crime, and the jury was
instructed accordingly.96 The Montana Supreme Court held that this violated
due process because it “relieved [the State] of part of its burden to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime
charged.”97 The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that because
the common law had long treated the voluntarily intoxicated as criminally
responsible no matter how incapacitated at the time of the crime, the
principle espoused by the Montana Supreme Court was not fundamentally
rooted in the American tradition and conscience.98
In Clark v. Arizona, the Supreme Court laid out the three types of mental
incapacity and the four major insanity excuses.99 Arizona had eliminated the
cognitive incapacity component of its affirmative insanity defense, leaving
only a pure moral incapacity affirmative defense.100 Cognitive incapacity
evidence would therefore only go to mens rea. As to the mens rea element,
Arizona barred psychiatric testimony to negate specific intent.101 Clark
argued that the cognitive incapacity affirmative defense was fundamentally
rooted in the American tradition and conscience so that he could raise it and
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

Id. at 532–36.
Id. at 536.
Id.
Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 40–41 (1996) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 41.
Id. (quoting State v. Egelhoff, 900 P.2d 260, 266 (Mont. 1995)).
Id. at 44–51.
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 748–49 (2006).
Id. at 751.
Id. at 745 (citing State v. Mott, 931 P.2d 1046 (Ariz. 1997) (en banc)).
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present psychiatric evidence to prove it.102 The Court rejected Clark’s
argument, both based on the historical evidence and because cognitive
incapacity by definition entails moral incapacity.103
Based on these decisions, the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari to
review the Idaho insanity excuse statute.104 But in 2019, it granted certiorari
to address James Kraig Kahler's case.105 The Court hoped to resolve the
question first posed in Washington state court in the early twentieth century.
However, the Court was not confronted with and did not consider the
argument I present below.
III. KAHLER V. KANSAS
Two days after Thanksgiving in 2009, Kahler murdered his wife, two
daughters, and his wife’s grandmother.106 Charged with murder in state
court, he argued that the new statute violated the Due Process Clause.107 The
trial court rejected his arguments, and ultimately the Kansas Supreme Court
did the same.108 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari109 and
affirmed the Kansas decision, holding that the Due Process Clause does not
require states to make insanity an excuse for murder.110
A.

A Heinous Quadruple-Murder

James Kraig Kahler had a perfect marriage—or so he said—until he gave
his wife, Karen, permission to engage in a homosexual relationship with a
coworker.111 Kraig soon became angry and believed the relationship was
destroying his marriage.112 After Kraig reversed course on Karen’s affair and
became violent, Karen filed for divorce.113 Kraig soon lost his marriage, his

102

Id. at 748.
Id. at 750–54.
104
Delling v. Idaho, 568 U.S. 1038, 1039 (2012). Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and
Sotomayor dissented from the denial of certiorari. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
105
Kahler v. Kansas, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019).
106
Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1027 (2020).
107
Id.
108
Id. (citing State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105, 124–25).
109
Kahler v. Kansas, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019).
110
Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1025–26 (2020).
111
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 7–8; Brief for Respondent at 2, 4, Kahler v. Kansas,
140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020) (No. 18-6135) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent]. To me, it is hard to
imagine which is more odd—that he gave permission, or that she requested it.
112
Brief for Respondent, supra note 102, at 3.
113
Id.; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 8.
103
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job, and his relationship with his two daughters.114 He ended up back on his
parents’ farm with nothing but daily chores and periodic visitation with his
nine-year-old son, Sean.115 When Karen refused to allow Sean to stay with
Kraig past the scheduled Thanksgiving visitation because of her family
tradition of visiting her grandmother, Kahler became upset.116 Several hours
later, he drove to Karen’s grandmother’s house, entered the home with a
high-powered rifle, and systematically shot his wife, her grandmother,
Dorothy, and his two daughters, Emily and Lauren.117 When the shooting
started, Sean ran out the back door.118 Kraig fled but was spotted the day after
on the side of a road and arrested.119
B.

State Court Proceedings

The case received considerable media coverage.120 Kansas charged Kahler
with multiple murders and sought the death penalty.121 Kahler raised the
defenses of insanity and diminished capacity, but the trial court disallowed
both.122 The jury convicted Kahler, and the judge sentenced him to death.123
114

Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 8–9; Brief for Respondent, supra note 102, at 4.
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1026; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 9–10; Brief for
Respondent, supra note 102, at 4–5.
116
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 9–10; Brief for Respondent, supra note 102, at 5.
117
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 10; Brief for Respondent, supra note 102, at 5;
Chris Fisher, Deputy First to Arrive at Gruesome Murder Recounts Dying Teen’s Last Words,
13WIBW (June 4, 2018, 11:06 AM), https://www.wibw.com/content/news/Deputy-first-toarrive-at-gruesome-murder-recounts-dying-teens-last-words-484479451.html; see Juan
Ignacio Blanco, James Kraig Kahler, MURDERPEDIA,
https://murderpedia.org/male.K/k/kahler-james-kraig.htm (last visited June 10, 2020)
(compiling basic information, news stories, and photographs).
118
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1027; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 10; Brief for
Respondent, supra note 102, at 5.
119
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1027; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 10.
120
See, e.g., Steve Fry, Kansas Jury Recommends Death for Kahler, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIB.
https://www.columbiatribune.com/article/20110829/News/308299700 (Aug. 29, 2011, 1:00
PM).
121
Man Charged with Killing Wife, 2 Daughters, NBC NEWS,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/34210991/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/man-chargedkilling-wife-daughters/#.XuEPDucpBhE (Nov. 30, 2009, 5:57 PM).
122
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 11; Brief for Respondent, supra note 101, at 9–10.
123
State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105, 112 (Kan. 2018); Jury Recommends Death Penalty for
Kahler, OFF. OF THE KAN. ATT’Y GEN. (Aug. 29, 2011), https://ag.ks.gov/media-center/newsreleases/2011-news-releases/2011/10/07/jury-recommends-death-penalty-for-kahler; Steve
Fry, Sarcastic Kahler Draws Death Penalty, TOPEKA CAP. J. (Oct. 11, 2011, 10:05 AM),
https://www.cjonline.com/article/20111011/NEWS/310119788; Aliyah Shahid, James Kraig
Kahler, Convicted of Killing Family After Wife’s Lesbian Affair, May Face Death Penalty,
115
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On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s ruling and
refused to reconsider its prior holding that the mens rea approach satisfied
due process.124 Kahler petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
certiorari, which it granted.125
C.

Briefs

Kahler’s brief argued that the moral incapacity excuse was enshrined in
the heart of the American legal system until a few agitators pulled the wool
over the eyes of an ignorant public and bumbling state lawmakers after
Hinckley’s failed assassination and subsequent acquittal.126 The history, they
wrote, clearly shows that insanity negates moral culpability and that due
process proscribes criminal responsibility absent moral culpability.127 Hence,
moral incapacity negates moral culpability and therefore negates criminal
responsibility.
Kansas responded in its brief by disputing the history. “[T]he various
insanity tests that have been used over the years demonstrate that the rightand-wrong insanity test is not deeply rooted in our history and tradition.”128
And the ancient texts produced by Kahler were “at best ambiguous and
consistent with the mens rea approach.”129 Relying on Supreme Court
precedent, Kansas also argued that, “given the complex legal, religious,
moral, philosophical, and medical questions involved,” the Constitution
gives great latitude to states in setting their criminal law.130 Kansas aptly
DAILY NEWS (Aug. 26, 2011, 10:15 AM),
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/james-kraig-kahler-convicted-killing-familywife-lesbian-affair-face-death-penalty-article-1.951568.
124
State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105, 124–25 (Kan. 2018).
125
Kahler v. Kansas, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019).
126
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at passim.
127
Id. at 12–29. Kahler’s lawyers were not the first to move from the general proposition
that Anglo-American law has always recognized that insanity negates moral culpability to
the proposition that moral incapacity negates moral culpability without doing a lot to show
exactly how the latter, a rather specific statement, follows from the former, a very general
one. See, e.g., Morse & Bonnie, supra note 33, at 488–89. I find it hard to explain why very
intelligent writers leap the vast chasm between the two statements on the strength of a bland,
unjustified, unsupported assertion. Perhaps the history is just too dicey for them to deal with
it in detail. See infra, Sections III.E, IV.A, and IV.B. Or perhaps they prefer not to spend a
month’s worth of summer evenings perusing the legal reports of insanity trials in days of
yore. If I had not taken a summer internship in an unfamiliar city in the middle of COVID19, I might not have tackled it myself.
128
Brief for Respondent, supra note 102, at 14–15.
129
Id. at 19.
130
Id. at 15 (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 88 (1992) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring)).
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observed that asserting that “those who are morally blameless should be
exempted from criminal liability . . . begs the question of who is morally
blameless.”131 And the current statutes of Alaska, Idaho, Montana, and Utah,
with several prior attempts at insanity reform, rounded out the argument that
the mens rea approach was consistent with American practice.132
The briefs of the amici mostly regurgitated the parties’ arguments.133 The
Brief for Legal Historians and Sociologists was a rare exception. It
contributed significantly to the lively historical debate.134 Criminal defense
lawyers from Idaho, Utah, and Montana wrote a brief that added a focus on
the financial cost of the criminal justice system.135 Various states supporting
Kansas emphasized popular sovereignty as a basis for “allow[ing] the People
through their legislatures to decide for themselves what is blameworthy.”136
D.

Oral Argument

At oral argument, Kahler’s attorney repeated the charge that Kansas was
doing what no state had ever done before—subjecting the insane to criminal
culpability.137 Justice Kagan broke through the fog about ten minutes into the
argument and asked about the historical evidence.138 She pointed out that the
test for whether a principle of law is protected by substantive due process is
whether history shows that it is fundamentally rooted in the American
tradition and conscience, but that “there are many ways in which
understandings of criminal culpability change over the years.”139 After
pointing out that not every part of the historical criminal law is protected
131

Id. at 15. The smoke and mirrors of the Petitioner’s argument is evident in discussions
that repeat the talismanic phrase “moral blameworthiness” and its equivalents while glossing
over the substantive question, which is whether the moral incapacity test is deeply engrained
in Anglo-American legal practice. See, e.g., Phillips & Woodman, supra note 62, at 463–66;
Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 974 (1932) (noting widespread and
longstanding agreement on moral blameworthiness and wrongful intent as a prerequisite to
criminal responsibility but “hopeless disagreement” on the precise state of mind required).
132
Brief for Respondent, supra note 101, at 27–31, 34–36.
133
E.g. ABA Brief, supra note 21, at passim.
134
E.g. Brief for Legal Historians and Sociologists, supra note 52, at 9, 13–14.
135
Brief for the Idaho Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Montana
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the Utah Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers, and the Salt Lake Legal Defender Association as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 4–5, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020) (No. 18-6135).
136
Brief of Amici Curiae for Utah, Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Idaho,
Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and
Texas Supporting Respondent at 6, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020) (No. 18-6135).
137
Transcript, supra note 21, at 5–6, 22.
138
Id. at 12–13.
139
Id. at 12.
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now, she asked, “[W]hat does due process require we hang onto
notwithstanding changing times?”140 She never got a straight answer.
Kansas began with a salvo against Kahler’s version of history.141 After
fending off some questions and dodging others, Kansas responded to Justice
Kavanaugh’s inquiry about the existence of some “baseline that is historically
rooted, above which there have been a variety of tests that have been accepted
by the states until . . . the end of the 20th century.”142 After some discussion
and further questioning, Justice Alito clarified that the effect on the Court’s
ruling would be the same if, for instance, in 1791 the mens rea for murder
always included the ability to understand that the murderous act was
wrong.143 The justices were unable to get a full answer before Kansas’s time
expired.
The United States as amicus emphasized the wide variety of insanity tests
employed by the states over time.144 Justice Kagan resurrected Justices
Kavanaugh and Alito’s point by stating that the historical record seems to
point to an insanity excuse broader than cognitive incapacity.145 In response,
the United States pointed out that “outlier states aren’t necessarily violating
substantive due process.”146 The United States also emphasized the
reasonableness of many different approaches to insanity, both in terms of
distinguishing between types of mental incapacity and in procedurally
accounting for those incapacities.147 The final point, made in response to a
question from Justice Sotomayor, was that the question before the Court was
not whether justice requires that the insane be acquitted, but whether the
American people had so clung to a specific “theory of moral culpability” as
to make that theory a baseline of due process.148
On rebuttal, Kahler’s attorney alleged that distinguishing between the
cognitively, morally, and volitionally incapacitated was “completely
arbitrary.”149 She also charged Kansas with adopting a position that put no
limits on states’ ability to define crimes.150 She finished her remarks by

140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

Id. at 13.
Id. at 30–34.
Id. at 45.
Transcript, supra note 21, at 46–48.
Id. at 50–54.
Id. at 55–56.
Id. at 56.
Id. at 59–60.
Id. at 60–61.
Transcript, supra note 21, at 61.
Id. at 62.
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returning to the historical argument.151 At the end, Justice Alito sparked a
short exchange in which he questioned her as to how to deal with the fact
that, according to Kahler, the moral incapacity excuse was embedded in the
mens rea element at common law, which, if correct, suggests that the moral
incapacity excuse should be applied to every crime.152 She answered that it
merely showed that moral incapacity has deep historical roots and is
therefore fundamentally rooted.153
E.

The Decision

Justice Kagan wrote the opinion for the six justices in the majority, which
included Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and
Kavanaugh. Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor joined Justice Breyer’s dissent.
Kahler raised an Eighth Amendment argument, but the Court held that he
waived it by not raising it before the Kansas Supreme Court.154 Both opinions
focused heavily on the historical evidence.
1.

Majority Opinion

The Court began with a survey of Clark and the legislative history of the
Kansas statute. Clark, Justice Kagan wrote, classified the four major insanity
tests described above.155 After describing the four major tests, the Court
explained that Kansas law provided that any defendant could present
evidence of mental disturbance to demonstrate a lack of the required mens
rea.156 Although “the Kansas statute [also] provides that ‘[m]ental disease or
defect is not otherwise a defense,’”157 defendants can raise mental illness as a
mitigating factor at sentencing.158
After recounting the facts and procedural posture of the case,159 the Court
laid out the relevant portions of its due process insanity excuse jurisprudence.
It is difficult to prove that a principle is fundamentally rooted and therefore
entitled to substantive due process protection.160 The inquiry is based on
history and evidenced by both Colonial Era and pre-Colonial Anglo151

Id. at 63.
Id. at 63–66.
153
Id. at 64–66.
154
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1027 n.4.
155
Id. at 1025 (citing Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749 (2006)); see infra Section II.B.
156
Id. (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5209 (Cum. Supp. 2018)).
157
Id. at 1026 (second alteration in original) (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5209 (Cum.
Supp. 2018)).
158
Id. (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-6815(c)(1)(C), 21-6625(a) (2018)).
159
Id. at 1026–27.
160
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1027 (citing Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 798 (1952)).
152
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American common law.161 “The question is whether a rule of criminal
responsibility is so old and venerable—so entrenched in the central values of
our legal system—as to prevent a State from ever choosing another.”162 Powell
established the principle that states have the prerogative to define crimes,
defenses, and burdens of proof.163 This principle, the Court said, is especially
critical “in addressing the contours of the insanity defense.”164 The moral,
philosophical, evidentiary, and medical problems involved—not to mention
the “wide disagreement”—are for the states and for legislatures to resolve, not
the judiciary.165 That is why the Court had twice refused to “define a specific
insanity test in constitutional terms.”166
Justice Kagan proceeded to point out the major flaws the majority saw in
Kahler’s argument. First, Kahler incorrectly argued that Kansas had
“altogether abolished the insanity defense.”167 In reality, his “central claim”
was “that Kansas has impermissibly jettisoned the moral-incapacity”
excuse.168 Second, the moral incapacity test was not actually “the touchstone
of legal insanity” at any time, let alone before the famous M’Naghten decision
in the mid-nineteenth century.169 Third, Kahler tried to cover gaps and
ambiguities in the historical record and dodged the question regarding the
moral incapacity test with the bland statement that insanity has long been a
ground for negating criminal responsibility.170 Fourth, Kahler disregarded
the significance of the feature of the Kansas statute that allowed any and all
evidence of mental illness to “mitigate culpability and lessen punishment.”171
Fifth, and at some length, the Court disputed Kahler’s version of history.
The Court concluded that some early common law writers adopted a moral
incapacity test and others a mens rea approach.172 Many early cases dealt both
with cognitive and moral capacity, but their “overall focus was less on
161

Id. at 1027–28.
Id. at 1028.
163
Id. (citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality opinion)).
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1028 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Powell, 392
U.S. at 536). The Court refused to create a specific test in Leland and in Clark. Id. at 1028–29
(citing Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 750–53 (2006); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800–
01 (1952).
167
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1029 (citing Brief for Petitioner, supra note 9, at 39).
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id. at 1030–31.
171
Id. at 1031.
172
Id. at 1032 (relying on early English legal treatises).
162
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whether a defendant thought his act moral than on whether he had the ability
to do much thinking at all.”173 Thus, “moral incapacity was a byproduct of
the kind of cognitive breakdown that precluded finding mens rea, rather than
a self-sufficient test of insanity.”174 The same was true of the unambiguous
cases Kahler cited in support of his position.175 M’Naghten, the Court said,
was the first case to “disaggregate[] the concepts of moral and cognitive
incapacity” and therefore took Anglo-American courts by storm.176 The
M’Naghten test itself was not required by due process, as Kahler conceded,
and even if it were, the Court would then have to choose between pure moral
incapacity and legal-moral incapacity—a tough decision because the moral
incapacity states vehemently disagree on which version is best.177 Besides,
because five states had adopted the mens rea approach and Congress
seriously considered it, the moral incapacity test could hardly be said to be
fundamental.178
2.

Dissenting Opinion

Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, dissented on
the ground that the moral incapacity test was fundamentally rooted.179 The
common law’s definition of a madman included those only morally
incapacitated, Justice Breyer wrote.180 Touching on the “wild beast” test of
insanity, he noted that animals can knowingly and intentionally kill people,
but they are not criminally culpable because they have no power of moral
judgment.181 He also pointed to Bracton’s famous treatise and argued that
Bracton’s definition of “madmen” included those who, like young children,
“cannot be held liable in damages unless he is capable of perceiving the
wrongful character of his act.”182 He argued the same for the equally famous
English jurists Sir Edward Coke, Sir Matthew Hale, and Sir William
173

Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1033. “In such cases, even the language of morality mostly worked
in service of the emphasis on cognition and mens rea. The idea was that if a defendant had
such a ‘total[] want of reason’ as to preclude moral thinking, he could not possibly have
formed the needed criminal intent.” Id. at 1034 (quoting Rex v. Lord Ferrers, 19 How. St. Tr.
886, 947 (1760)).
174
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1034.
175
Id.
176
Id. at 1034–35.
177
Id. at 1035–36.
178
Id. at 1036–37. The proposal had bipartisan support. Id. at 1037 (citing United States
v. Pohlot, 827 F.2d 889, 899 (3d Cir. 1987)).
179
Id. at 1038–39 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
180
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1040 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
181
Id.
182
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Blackstone.183 He also pointed out that the modern concept of mens rea is
“narrower and more technical” than it used to be, and then used early English
and American cases to prove that it formerly included moral capacity.184
Justice Breyer concluded with the post-Colonial history of the insanity
excuse, a plea for conforming the insanity excuse to America’s views on
moral blameworthiness, and a rebuttal of Kansas’s arguments.185
IV. DUE PROCESS REQUIRES MORE THAN THE COGNITIVE INCAPACITY TEST
Although three justices hinted at it during oral argument, neither opinion
mentioned the third option: the Due Process Clause guarantees no specific
insanity excuse, but requires one which is broader than mere cognitive
incapacity.186 This rule is consistent with the Supreme Court’s precedents and
supported by history. It can be articulated with precision and proved to the
satisfaction of most of the Justices. And it obviates concerns about an
inflexible constitutional insanity test.
A.

Precisely Articulated Principle

When someone challenges a statute on substantive due process grounds,
the challenger must precisely articulate the deeply rooted principle.187 But the
principle may be broad in scope.188 Hence, the broad principle I advocate
183

Id. at 1042 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1042–45.
185
Id. at 1046–50.
186
See supra notes 142–143, 146 and accompanying text.
187
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S.
292, 302 (1993); Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992); Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 277–78 (1990)); Transcript, supra note 21,
at 57.
188
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 671 (2015) (citations omitted). The Obergefell
Court, which held that the right to marriage guaranteed by substantive due process includes
the right to homosexual marriage and did so, in practice if not in theory, by broadening the
principles the Court’s precedents had previously established. See id. (citations omitted).
Along the way, the Court explained the precedents as follows:
Glucksberg did insist that liberty under the Due Process Clause must be
defined in a most circumscribed manner, with central reference to
specific historical practices. Yet while that approach may have been
appropriate for the asserted right there involved (physician-assisted
suicide), it is inconsistent with the approach this Court has used in
discussing other fundamental rights, including marriage and intimacy.
Loving did not ask about a “right to interracial marriage”; Turner did not
ask about a “right of inmates to marry”; and Zablocki did not ask about a
“right of fathers with unpaid child support duties to marry.” Rather, each
case inquired about the right to marry in its comprehensive sense, asking
184
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here—that an insanity excuse limited to cognitive incapacity is deficient—is
appropriate. Precisely stated, that broad principle is that the cognitive
incapacity excuse alone is not broad enough to excuse from criminal liability
those not truly responsible for their crimes and therefore not worthy of
criminal punishment because cognitive capacity is not the sole mental
prerequisite to criminal fault.
B.

Persuading a Majority

In every important due process insanity case, the challenger was unable to
persuade a majority of the justices. The Court was not convinced that the
historical evidence or psychiatric advances militated against the moral
incapacity test in 1952,189 nor for it to the exclusion of other tests in 2006.190
The Kahler majority was also unconvinced. But the three minority justices
would probably be happy to limit Kahler.
Justices Alito, Kagan, and Kavanaugh asked questions which suggest they
briefly considered the argument this Article advances, or at least would be
open to considering it. Justice Kavanaugh asked the Kansas attorney whether
there was some “baseline that is historically rooted, above which there have
been a variety of tests that have been accepted by the states until . . . the end
of the 20th century?”191 He then queried, “[S]ince the early 1800s, at least, to
the late 20th century in the United States, didn’t every state allow some form
of a separate insanity defense at the guilty phase?”192 And he again clarified:
“[A]ll the states had something separate from the [mens rea] approach at the
guilt phase through the end of the 20th century.”193 Justice Alito joined in by
clarifying that Justice Kavanaugh’s point would hold true if the early
American mens rea element included a moral incapacity test.194
During the United States’ portion, Justice Kagan resurrected Justices
Kavanaugh and Alito’s point by asking how she could rule for Kansas,
assuming she concluded that the historical evidence showed that the insanity
excuse went beyond the modern concept of mens rea.195 She then said, “[I]t’s
less helpful to me to go over each case one by one than for you to tell
if there was a sufficient justification for excluding the relevant class from
the right.
Id. (citations omitted).
189
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 796–97, 800–01 (1952).
190
Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 752–53 (2006).
191
Transcript, supra note 21, at 45.
192
Id. at 46.
193
Id.
194
Id. at 47–48.
195
Id. at 55–56.
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me [if] . . . what I think is true[, that] . . . there’s just a ton that suggests
that . . . there was something more than a requirement that the
defendant . . . be able to form an intent to kill.”196 To me, her tone seems to
indicate she was stating her opinion, not continuing the assumption.197
C.

Historical Evidence

The Due Process Clause prohibits the states from defining crimes and
establishing criminal procedures in ways that “offend[] [a] principle of justice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.”198 The “primary guide in determining whether the principle in
question is fundamental is, of course, historical practice.”199 “Our collective
conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame,”200 but
early and modern American views on fault and criminal responsibility are
not easily defined in a manner both concise and comprehensive. That is why
“the common-law cases reveal no settled consensus favoring Kahler’s
preferred insanity rule.”201 But baked into the American legal tradition and
the public conscience is the principle that cognitive capacity is not the only
mental prerequisite to fault, and therefore to criminal liability. This idea has
been embodied in concrete legal protections for centuries, and the historical
case for the insufficiency of the cognitive incapacity excuse is strong. The
Court should recognize the fundamental and deeply rooted principle that
cognitive capacity is not the sole mental prerequisite to criminal fault.
1.

Early English Writers

The early English writers consistently based criminal responsibility on
moral and volitional capacity. Early English law distinguished between
“ideots” and “lunaticks.” Idiots were those insane from birth.202 A blind deafmute was taken to be an idiot because the person’s mind lacked the senses
necessary to understand the world.203 Lunatics became insane later in life “by
196

Id. at 57.
Oral Argument at 52:52–53:14, Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021 (2020) (No. 18-6135),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/18-6135.
198
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
199
Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996) (plurality opinion).
200
Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954) (citing Holloway v.
United States, 148 F.2d 665, 666–67 (D.C. Cir. 1945)).
201
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1034.
202
GEORGE DALE COLLINSON, 1 A TREATISE ON THE LAW CONCERNING IDIOTS, LUNATICS,
AND OTHER PERSONS NON COMPOTES MENTIS 2 (1812).
203
Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
197
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the visitation of God.”204 Many lunatics wafted in and out of sanity,
sometimes bereft of some or all of their rational powers, at other times fully
sane. These periods of sanity were referred to as “lucid intervals.”205
The insanity excuse was closely tied to the infancy excuse. The Kahler
majority conceded that under English law, “a madman could no sooner be
found criminally liable than a child.”206 The early English legal treatises have
much to say on the mental capacity required for a child or adult to be found
criminally liable.
a.

Henry de Bracton

In the thirteenth century, Henry de Bracton—whose spelling, like that of
the other early English writers, I take the liberty of updating where most
distracting—summarized and analyzed the English common law. Bracton
“wrote that ‘it is will and purpose which mark malificia’ and ‘a crime is not
committed unless the intention to injure exists.’”207 He also said that the
“insane [were] not far removed from the brutes.”208 Kansas argued that
Bracton’s “wild beast” test meant that the insanity excuse of Bracton’s day
included only those “not far removed from the brutes” by reason of “not
know[ing] what [they are] doing” and “lacking . . . mind and reason.”209
Whatever Bracton’s precise meaning, “will and purpose” combined with
“the intention to injure” probably means something beyond the mere
knowledge that one’s act will result in the death of a human being rather than
a kitten or lemur. Justice Breyer astutely observed that surely a lion
cognitively understands killing other creatures, and surely also understands
the basic difference between killing an antelope and killing a human being.210
Hence, even if Bracton’s “brute animal” formulation of the insanity excuse is
tied directly to his concept of “intent” or “understanding,” those concepts
were broader in the thirteenth century than the modern cognitive incapacity
excuse. In thirteenth-century thought, the way a deer understands the
204

Id. at 5.
E.g. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *25 (“[I]f a lunatic has lucid intervals of
understanding, he shall answer for what he does in those intervals, as if he had no
deficiency.).
206
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1030 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 2 HENRY DE
BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 384 (Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968)).
207
Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive in the
Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 655 (1993) (quoting BRACTON, supra
note 206, at 384).
208
Eugene J. Chesney, The Concept of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, 29 J. OF THE AM. L.
INST. OF CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 627, 640 (1939) (citation omitted).
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Brief for Respondent, supra note 101, at 21 (quoting Sayre, supra note 131, at 1005).
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Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1040 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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difference between wolves and humans is far different from the way that
mentally healthy adult human beings understand the difference between
wolves and humans.211 Therefore, Bracton’s “wild beast” test must have been
broader than the modern version of cognitive incapacity.
211
Although the criminal prosecution of animals in medieval times was actually a thing,
it seems to have been far more prominent on the Continent than in England. See Jen Girgen,
The Historical and Contemporary Prosecution and Punishment of Animals, 9 ANIMAL L.J. 97
(2003). Much of it, too, seems to have been conducted with great regard to legal formalities
and little or no regard to the animals’ moral faculties. Id. at 102 (“In spite of the skilled
arguments attorneys made on behalf of their animal clients, the defendants usually failed to
appear in court on their appointed day and therefore typically lost the case by default.”). One
potential important explanation for the trials is legal sanction for an act of economic
destruction, but that explanation only suffices for executions of domesticated animals. And
the legal writers of the time period did not account for the criminal prosecution of animals
based on any pretense to their having the same kinds of cognitive and moral capacities as
humans, but primarily as a way to recognize the significance of the damage the animals had
caused. Id. at 117 & n. 141.
The early American scholarship on this topic seems to have been dominated by Edward
Payson Evans, who combined and expanded two of his prior articles for a book on the
subject. EDWARD PAYSON EVANS, THE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF
ANIMALS (1906). For historiographical reasons, it is difficult to discern the extent to which all
of these reported trials actually happened. Eric Grundhauser, The Truth and Myth Behind
Animal Trials in the Middle Ages, ATLAS OBSCURA (Aug. 10, 2015) (“The sources are 19th
century scholars who didn’t both to give a whole lot of explicit information on where they
found [their information].”). Nevertheless, sufficient historical evidence remains and is
discoverable to show that these trials actually occurred. Peter Dinzelbacher, Animal Trials: A
Multidisciplinary Approach, 32 INTERDISCIPLINARY HISTORY 405, 407 (2002).
In any event, there is adequate evidence that medieval legal thinkers believed that animals,
though they might lack an ability to understand the concept of humanity or of “wolfness,”
they could perceive humans and wolves—yet they had not the faintest idea of the moral and
intellectual faculties that distinguished people from animals. ANSELM OELZE, ANIMAL
RATIONALITY 27, 34–43 (Investigating Medieval Philosophy No. 12, John Merenbon et al.,
eds., 2018). Oelze explains the medieval thinking on the distinction between humans and the
higher animals:
In short, the discontinuity between humans and other animals consists
in the fact that only the former have rational or intellectual souls.
Consequently, humans are not simply animals but a very peculiar kind
of animals, namely, “rational animals” (animalia rationalia). They are, so
to speak, “animals plus x” with “x” being the faculties of intellect and
reason.
Id. at 36 (footnote omitted). But “what are the specific operations of rational [and
intellectual] souls?” Id. at 37. Oelze further explains the reason or intellect with which
humans are endowed but of which animals were thought to be wholly destitute.
In most accounts there are three main intellectual operations, namely, (i) universal
cognition and concept formation, (ii) judging, and (iii) reasoning.
....
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Further, Bracton based criminal responsibility on both cognition and
volition.212 That his medieval ideas of evidence and mental disturbance
prevented him from forming a legal test as broad as modern Anglo-American
tests does not undermine his adherence to the basic premise that criminal
responsibility hinges upon a free will, which demands a properly working
mind.
b.

William Lambard

William Lambard wrote that a person without “knowledge of good [or]
evil” was a madman, and therefore not criminally liable.213 Lambard, like
Michael Dalton in the same century and Bracton much earlier, “selected
cognition and volition as elements of criminal responsibility, mentioning the
cognitive capacities of knowledge and understanding (including knowledge
and understanding of good and evil) and the volitional capacity of will.”214
c.

Michael Dalton

Michael Dalton, for his part, highlighted the knowledge of good and evil
and the functions of the will as prerequisites for criminal responsibility.215 A
The connection between the intellect’s operations and its nature shows that it is not
the case that the animal/human boundary can only be described in terms of
capacities. It can also be described in more general terms as being largely identical
with other dividing lines. First, it is identical with the sensory/intellectual divide
because nonhuman animals have sensory powers while humans have intellectual
faculties in addition.
....
This, of course, has an impact on how different animals perceive or, as one could
also say, on how they mentally represent the world. To give an example, a sheep
only perceives this or that particular wolf. Humans, in contract, also cognize the
universal “wolf.” In modern terms, we possess the concept of “wolf” by means of
which we can refer to all particular wolves. The sheep, however, lacks such a
concept.
Id. at 38, 42, 52 (emphasis in original). The significance of these patterns of medieval thought
is that a dog could perceive a human being, distinguish the human from a nearby rabbit, and
maul the human to death with at least some degree or form of understanding what it did. See
id. at 52–53. Hence, a person “not far removed from the brutes” could have cognitive
capacity, or at least something closely akin to it. If, on the other hand, the criminal
prosecution of animals is taken to imply that people in medieval times thought of animals as
having considerably more cognitive and moral faculties than most modern humans attribute
to them, this also supports the conclusion that a “brute beast” insanity test is broader than
mere cognitive incapacity.
212
Sendor, supra note 40, at 1374 (citations omitted).
213
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1032 (quoting WILLIAM LAMBARD, EIRENARCHA 218 (1581)).
214
Sendor, supra note 40, at 1374 (citations omitted).
215
Id. at 1374–75 (citations omitted).
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person without “knowledge of good and evill” could not “have a felonius
intent, nor a will or minde to doe harm.”216 Almost in the same breath, Dalton
tied the mental capacities of adults to those of children: a child could “commit
Homicide, and . . . be hanged for it, viz. if it may appeare . . . that he had
knowledge of good and evill, and of the perill and danger of that offence.”217
d.

Anthony Fitzherbert

Anthony Fitzherbert founded the criminal responsibility of children and
adults alike on their “memory and discretion.”218 The Oxford English
Dictionary defines the age of discretion as the “age at which a person is
presumed to be capable of exercising sound judgment in speech and
action,”219 a far cry from mere cognitive understanding. Fitzherbert’s use of
the phrase affirms a broad definition of the word discretion: “an Infant of the
age of 14 years has such discretion . . . [that] if he at such age commit [a]
felony, he shall be hanged for the same,” but if a person under 21 attempted
to lease or sell property, the lease or sale “shall not bind him . . . because he
hath not perfect discretion or knowledge what he ought to do, or what is to
his profit, or disadvantage before such age.”220 Like an infant, Fitzherbert
wrote, an insane person without discretion could not be held responsible for
his crimes.221 And an absence of discretion is an absence of the higher rational
powers of sound judgment and its attendant mental abilities, not necessarily
the absence of all or nearly all cognitive abilities whatsoever.222
e.

Edward Coke

Sir Edward Coke defined murder as “when a man of sound memory, and
of the age of discretion, unlawfully killeth within any county of the realm any
reasonable creature in rerum natura under the king’s peace, with malice
afore-thought.”223 Because malice was essentially the intent to kill, a person
216
Anthony Platt & Bernard L. Diamond, The Origins of the Right and Wrong Test of
Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An Historical
Survey, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1227, 1235 (1966) (quoting MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTREY
JUSTICE 244 (1530)).
217
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting DALTON, supra note 215, at 244).
218
ANTHONY FITZHERBERT, THE NEW NATURA BREVIUM 491 (William Rastall ed. & trans.,
1666).
219
Discretion, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2013) (citing examples from 1485,
1542, 1641, 1749, 1863, 1911, and 1978).
220
FITZHERBERT, supra note 216, at 492.
221
Id.
222
See id. at 491–92.
223
EDWARD COKE, 3 INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 47 (E. & R. Brooke ed., 1797).
Every person was considered a “reasonable creature.” See id. at 50.
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could not be held liable for murder without having intended to kill the
victim.224 A person so deeply disturbed as to lose all understanding and
imagination could not be prosecuted for treason based on his “compassing,”
or imagining, the king’s death.225 Beyond that, neither a person non compos
mentis—the Latin version of “unsound mind”—nor an infant under the age
of discretion could commit murder as Coke defined it.226
Even if Coke’s invocation of the ambiguous phrase non compos mentis did
not explicitly include either moral or volitional incapacity for adults, Justice
Kagan’s opinion acknowledged that the insanity and infancy defenses are
closely parallel.227 And, in another place, Coke describes intoxicated
criminals as non compos mentis.228 Because intoxication must be very severe
to negate the mens rea for murder, it makes more sense to interpret Coke's
use of the phrase non compos mentis as a fairly broad term for insanity. And
no person without discretion, whether because of tender age or a mental
defect, was to be criminally punished.
f.

John Brydell

John Brydell, in his treatise on the law of insanity, interpreted Coke to
mean that a man without memory who commits a murder could not be held
responsible because the absence of memory and understanding equals
“involuntary ignorance.”229 Madmen and children without discretion, he
wrote, were excused from responsibility for any felony.230 A madman was not
responsible for his crimes because a madman lacks his mind and
discretion.231 The law ascribed the crime to the madman’s involuntary
ignorance, not his free and knowing choice, and therefore excused him.232
This ties culpability to volitional capacity as Brydell understood it.
Brydell’s discussion of suicide, or felo de se, mirrors Coke’s. Brydell restates
the proposition that a non compos mentis who kills himself is not guilty of
suicide any more than a non compos mentis who kills another is guilty of
224

Id. at 50.
Id. at 6.
226
Id. at 4.
227
Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1030 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing BRACTON, supra
note 206, at 384).
228
Beverley’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 1118, 1122 (1603).
229
JOHN BRYDALL, NON COMPOS MENTIS, OR, THE LAW RELATING TO NATURAL FOOLS,
MAD-FOLKS, AND LUNATICK PERSONS INQUISITED AND EXPLAINED FOR COMMON BENEFIT 76 (R.
& E. Atkins eds., 1700).
230
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id.
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murder.233 So, too, a person did not commit suicide by deliberately injuring
himself merely because he “recovered his Memory” before dying.234 While
Coke and Brydell’s use of the word “memory” is difficult to define precisely,
it is broader than the modern sense of the faculty of remembering. The
Oxford English Dictionary provides several different examples of the term’s
legal usage, including early uses that indicate that being of sound or perfect
memory does not merely refer to the ability to perceive and understand the
basic realities of one’s current surroundings.235
g.

Matthew Hale

Sir Matthew Hale’s famous treatise The History of the Pleas of the Crown
discussed insanity in some depth, and his work have been said to have been
“the best treatment of the subject up to its time.”236 Hale explained that
insanity may be total or partial and compared the mental capacities of insane
adults to those of children. Some people are lucid on some topics, yet insane
with respect to others.237 Others are lucid to some degree, yet at least partially
mentally disturbed.238 Hale explained the evidentiary problem and compared
the mental capacities of insane adults to those of children:
[F]or doubtless [most who choose to become felons] are
under a degree of partial insanity, when they commit these
offenses: it is very difficult to define the indivisible line that
divides perfect and partial insanity; but it must rest upon
circumstances duly to be weighed and considered both by
the judge and jury, lest on the one side there be a kind of
inhumanity towards the defects of human nature, or on the
other side too great an indulgence given to great crimes: the
best measure that I can think of is this; such a person as
labouring under melancholy distempers hath yet ordinarily
as great understanding, as ordinarily a child of fourteen

233
234
235

Id. at 78.
Id.
Memory, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2001) (citing examples from 1402 to

1998).
236
Homer D. Crotty, The History of Insanity as a Defence to Crime in English Criminal
Law, 12 CAL. L. REV. 105, 112 (1924).
237
MATTHEW HALE, 1 THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 29 (George Wilson ed.
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years hath, is such a person as may be guilty of treason or
felony.239
Kansas admitted in its brief that Hale founded the excuses of insanity and
infancy on the same kinds of mental capacities, or lack thereof, but argued
that Hale limited both to mens rea and asserted that Hale’s chapter on
insanity said “nothing about right and wrong or good and evil.”240 Kansas was
right that Hale expressly tied infancy and insanity to the same foundational
mental requirements.241 But, contrary to Kansas’s argument, Hale expressly
stated that an infant—a child under the age of fourteen—was responsible for
his crimes only if “it appears to the court and jury that he was doli capax, and
could discern between good and evil.”242 He wrote again that “if it appear by
strong and pregnant evidence and circumstances, that he had discretion to
judge between good and evil, judgment of death may be given against him.”243
As for the insanity excuse for adults, Hale’s version is demonstrably
broader than the modern cognitive incapacity excuse. Those with a “total
alienation of mind” or “totally depriv[ed] of the use of reason” were not
responsible for their crimes because they were “in effect in the condition of
brutes.”244 Justice Breyer’s astute comment on the cognitive ability of
predators shows that Hale’s conception of human reason, like that of his
contemporaries, was so expansive that one could be said to completely lose it
and yet retain the basic ability to distinguish between the types of creatures
and to understand death and killing. Thus, a person could be said to so
completely lose the use of his powers of understanding as to be on the level
of a wild animal, and yet not necessarily be able to take advantage of the
modern cognitive incapacity excuse.
This interpretation is borne out by the example Hale recounts at the end
of his discussion of insanity and murder. Hale tells of a woman who “fell into
a temporary frenzy” from lack of sleep and murdered her newborn baby.245
When others came in, yet before she had “recovered her understanding,” she
told them she had killed it and showed them the body.246 The jury acquitted
her after being instructed that if “she had the use of reason when she did it,
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Brief for Respondent, supra note 101, at 22 (citing Sayre, supra note 131, at 1006)
Sayre, supra note 131, at 1006 (citations omitted).
HALE, supra note 236, at 25.
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Id. at 30–31 (citations omitted).
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they were to find her guilty.”247 She seems to have known she was killing her
child when she committed the deed, and she certainly knew it when she told
it to others. And she could be said to be “deprived of the use of all reason”
even though she retained cognitive capacity.
Hale’s example rebuts the force of Justice Kagan’s assertion that “the
language of morality mostly worked in service of the emphasis on cognition
and mens rea” and her argument that someone “destitute of all power of
judgment” rendered moral incapacity “a byproduct of the kind of cognitive
breakdown that precluded finding mens rea[] rather than a self-sufficient”
insanity excuse.248 Rather than “serv[ing] as a sign . . . that the defendant
lacked the needed criminal intent,”249 Hale’s moral incapacity excuse stood
despite significant evidence of cognitive capacity. And the early writers’
strong language can be partially explained as evidentiary demands based on
fears of faking insanity.250
h.

William Hawkins

William Hawkins’ legal treatise, The Pleas of the Crown, contains a clear
statement of the pure moral incapacity test. Like Hale and Blackstone, he
wrote that criminal responsibility depended on volitional capacity and that
cognitive and moral incapacity could impair volitional incapacity to the point
of vitiating criminal responsibility.251 He equated the infancy and insanity
excuses and tied both to the pure moral incapacity test: “[T]hose who are
under a natural Disability of distinguishing between Good and Evil, as
Infants under the Age of Discretion, Ideots and Lunaticks, are not punishable
by any criminal prosecution whatsoever.”252
247

Id.
Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1034 (2020) (citation omitted).
249
Id.
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Jurists of the time would have been familiar with the Biblical story of David faking
insanity in front of Achish, King of Gath. Once David was recognized as the famous Israelite
who had killed the giant Goliath, David drooled and bashed his head, fooling the king into
thinking David was insane and dismissing David from his presence without the revenge
David dreaded. 1 Samuel 21:12-15.
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Sendor, supra note 40, at 1375.
252
1 WILLIAM HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 2 (1716); Crotty, supra note 235, at 113.
Sendor, using the term “cognitive incapacity” to include the both cognitive and moral
incapacity, as I use those terms here, explained that Hawkins “identified cognitive capacity as
the key factor in the insanity defense.” Sendor, supra note 39, at 1376. Hawkins further
explained the infancy defense:
And if it appear by the Circumstances, that in Infant under the Age of
Discretion could distinguish between Good and Evil, as if one of the Age
of nine or ten Years kill another, and hide the Body, or make Excuses, or
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William Blackstone

Sir William Blackstone united all “pleas and excuses” to “this single
consideration: the want or defect of will.”253 Thus, for Blackstone and the
common law of his day, the insanity excuse was ultimately founded upon the
freedom of the will. Although Blackstone and his jurisprudential forefathers
were skeptical of modern theories of irresistible impulses and fearful of
violators feigning insanity to escape punishment,254 they recognized that a
defect of the will was a—or the—proper ground for absolving an insane
defense from criminal responsibility:
An involuntary act, as it has no claim to merit, so neither can
it induce any guilt; the concurrence of the will, when it has
its choice either to do or to avoid the fact in question, being
the only thing that renders human actions either
praiseworthy or culpable. Indeed, to make a complete crime,
cognizable by human laws, there must be both a will and an
act. . . .
N[ow] there are cases, in which the will does not join with
the act: 1. Where there is a defect of understanding. For
where there is no discernment, there is no choice; and where
there is no choice, there can be no act of the will, which is
nothing else but a determination of one’s choice, to do or to
abstain from a particular action: he therefore, that has no
understanding, can have no will to guide his conduct. . . . It
will be the business of the present chapter briefly to consider
all the several species of defect in will, as they fall under some
one or other of these general heads: as infancy, idiocy,
lunacy, and intoxication, which fall under the first class;
misfortune, and ignorance, which may be referred to the
second; and compulsion or necessity, which may properly
rank in the third.255
hide himself, he may be convicted and condemned, and forfeit, &c. as
much as if he were of full Age. But in such a Case the Judges will in
Prudence respite the Execution in order to get a Pardon: And it is said,
That if an Infant apparently wanting Discretion, be indicted and found
guilty of Felony, the Justice themselves may dismiss him without a
pardon, &c.
HAWKINS, supra note 251, at 2 (footnote omitted).
253
BLACKSTONE, supra note 205, at *20 (emphasis in original).
254
Supra note 250 and accompanying text.
255
BLACKSTONE, supra note 205, at *20–22.
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Blackstone, like Dalton, tied infancy and insanity closely together—both
excuses relied upon mental deficiencies, including pure moral incapacity.
Children were not subject to criminal prosecution of any sort until they
reached the “age of discretion.”256 Children under seven years old could
commit no crime whatsoever.257 Nor, generally speaking, could children
above seven but between the ages seven to ten and a half.258 Children beyond
ten and a half received reduced punishment but were held criminally
responsible if “capable of mischief” (doli capaces).259
The age of discretion for capital crimes was generally twelve, but age was
not the sole factor in criminal liability for homicidal children: “the capacity
of doing ill, or contracting guilt, is not so much measured by years and days,
as by the strength of the delinquent's understanding and judgment.”260
Children above fourteen were presumed “capable of mischief,” but those
under fourteen were presumed not punishable unless the evidence showed
that “he was doli capax, and could discern between good and evil.”261 Prior
cases showed that a girl of thirteen and boys of ten and nine were sentenced
to death because they hid the bodies of their victims, “manifest[ing] a
consciousness of guilt, and a discretion to discern between good and evil.”262
Boys of eight and ten, respectively, were executed for felonies because they
showed “a mischievous discretion” and “malice, revenge, and cunning.”263
The insanity defense of Blackstone’s day also rested upon a volitional
defect resulting from deficient understanding. Like infancy, insanity excused
criminal liability when it caused a “defective or vitiated understanding.264
256

Id. at 22.
Id. at 22–23.
258
Id.
259
Id.
260
Id. at 23.
261
BLACKSTONE, supra note 205, at *23.
262
Id. at 23–24.
263
Id. at 24. The word “discretion” describes the moral faculties more than it does
cognitive capacity. See WILLIAM OLDNALL RUSSELL, 1 A TREATISE OF CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS 2 (Daniel Davis ed., 1824) (“[T]hough an infant at the age of eighteen, or
even fourteen, by his own acts, may be guilty of a forcible entry, and may be fined for the
same; yet he cannot be imprisoned, because his infancy is an excuse by reason of his
indiscretion.”) (emphasis added) (citing Hale’s treatise). The original edition’s pagination is
in brackets on the side, but here I refer only to the pagination of the edition cited.
264
BLACKSTONE, supra note 205, at *25. Sendor, using the term “cognitive incapacity” to
include the both cognitive and moral incapacity as I use those terms here, explained that
“Hale, Hawkins, and Blackstone represent the third pattern among pre-M’Naghten
commentators: those who viewed volitional capacity as the basic mental criterion of criminal
liability, and who saw cognitive capacity as a secondary criterion, a condition of volitional
capacity.” Sendor, supra note 39, at 1375.
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“Total idiocy” and “absolute insanity” excused the mentally disturbed from
responsibility for “any criminal action committed under deprivation of the
senses.”265 Those with “lucid intervals” were answerable for crimes
committed during their periods of clear thinking.266 Blackstone did not
elaborate on these principles, except to state that idiots and lunatics were “not
chargeable for their own acts, if committed when under their incapacities.”267
But he says that voluntary intoxication is not a defense, but an aggravation of
crime, even if it has the same mental effect as insanity.268 It is instructive that
drunkards who commit crimes frequently retain their cognitive capacity but
lack the inhibitions that normally govern their behavior.
j.

Summary

From the thirteenth to the eighteenth centuries, the great common law
writers consistently treated the insanity and infancy excuses similarly and
sometimes equally. Each writer adopted the pure moral incapacity excuse for
infants and something similar or the same for the insanity excuse. Even in
Coke’s brief treatment of insanity, the moral incapacity test lurks behind his
words. The other writers, especially Hawkins, more straightforwardly applied
the moral incapacity excuse to insane adults. Even if the more ambiguous
writers are read to restrict the insanity excuse to those capable of forming
“intention” or “understanding” in a form of the wild beast test, such a reading
is inconsistent with the modern mens rea approach because the Christianized
common law writers understood human reason to be so expansive and
powerful that losing it and becoming “like one of the brute animals” was not
necessarily to drop so low as to lose all cognitive capacity. Like modern
legislators and scholars, early English jurists and writers struggled to frame
the best insanity excuse and capture it precisely in words. But the historical
record leaves no doubt that none of them believed the modern cognitive
incapacity excuse was enough. They left unequivocal evidence that the
Anglo-American people’s basic views of criminality and responsibility
demand a broader insanity excuse.
2.

Authoritative English Cases

The reported English cases upon which Kahler and Kansas drew, and
upon which early American practice was based, developed and enshrined an
insanity excuse based primarily on cognitive and moral incapacity. Despite
claims that the moral incapacity excuse essentially dates from the famous
265
266
267
268
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Id. at 25–26 (citation omitted).

64

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15:1

M’Naghten case in 1843, the authoritative cases that preceded it uniformly
employed the moral incapacity test. “[T]he principles, by which the criminal
jurisprudence of this country is guided in cases of insanity, are the capability
of distinguishing between right and wrong—of knowing that the crime, of
which the party may stand accused, is an offence against the laws of God and
nature.”269 Like the early English writers, the most widely cited English cases
stressed that the insanity excuse is based on volitional defects, some of which
result from cognitive and moral incapacity.270 And “it is . . . established by a
multitude of cases in English and Scotch jurisprudence, that as a general
principle, this test, viz.—the competency to distinguish between right and
wrong, has been the main point kept in view when the plea of insanity has
been urged as an extenuation of crime.”271 Contrary to Justice Kagan’s
argument that “the language of morality mostly worked in service of the
emphasis on cognition and mens rea,”272 the moral incapacity test was an
independent basis for excusing the insane. The moral incapacity test was
almost completely uncriticized and the most important insanity excuse of the
eighteenth century.273
a.

Rex v. Arnold (1724)

The insanity test embodied in the jury instructions given in Rex v.
Arnold274 went far beyond the cognitive incapacity test. Edward Arnold was
prosecuted for the shooting of Lord Onslow.275 Two witnesses testified that
he was a “morose” person but were uncertain as to whether he was a
lunatic.276 The woman who sold him ammunition believed him to be “as
sensible as any customer [she] had.”277 A witness who knew him and had
talked with him shortly before the shooting said that he was not in his right
senses at the time and that all the neighbors knew that he was often out of his
senses.278 A witness who examined Arnold in prison gave ambiguous
269
FORBES WINSLOW, THE PLEA OF INSANITY IN CRIMINAL CASES 10–11 (Lawbook
Exchange, Lit. ed. 2005).
270
Sendor, supra note 40, at 1376.
271
WINSLOW, supra note 269, at 13.
272
Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1034 (2020) (emphasis in original).
273
Platt & Diamond, supra note 216, at 1236, 1250 (citing RAY, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE
OF INSANITY 13 (3d ed. 1853)); Sayre, supra note 131, at 1006.
274
Rex v. Arnold (1724), 16 How. St. Tr. 695.
275
Id. at 699. Onslow survived the shooting and requested clemency for Arnold, which
was granted. Id. at 766.
276
Id. at 707.
277
Id. at 708.
278
Id. at 711. The witness suggested he might have been drunk. Id.
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statements as to his sanity.279 One of his brothers affirmed that he was a
madman,280 and another testified that he was “not perfect in his senses” and
“did not know what he did at some certain times.”281 Arnold told one of his
brothers that Onslow had “bewitched” and “plague[d] . . . [him] day and
night.”282
The state’s attorneys summed up Arnold’s acts before the murder, all of
which showed full cognitive awareness: Arnold bought fresh powder and
shot, fired his gun to remove the old powder and ensure the gun was in good
working order, and ascertained where Lord Onslow was hunting.283 After the
shooting, Arnold was asked why he did not shoot a different person, and he
responded that the other man was innocent, but Lord Onslow a wicked
man.284 Earlier that morning, he purchased ammunition and asked for the
biggest size of shot available.285
The judge instructed the jury that the prosecution had proved that Arnold
had “shot [Onslow], and that wilfully.”286 The only question that remained
was the question of malice, which depended on whether Arnold, at the time
of the killing, “ha[d] the use of his reason and sense.”287 The judge explained:
If he was under the visitation of God, and could not
distinguish between good and evil, and did not know what
he did, though he committed the greatest offence, yet he
could not be guilty of any offence against any law
whatsoever; for guilt arises from the mind, and the wicked
will and intention of the man. If a man be deprived of his
reason, and consequently of his intention, he cannot be
guilty; and if that be the case, though he had actually killed
my lord Onslow, he is exempted from punishment. . . . [I]t is
not every frantic and idle humour of a man, that will exempt
him from justice, and the punishment of the law. When a
man is guilty of a great offence, it must be very plain and
clear, before a man is allowed such an exemption; therefore
it is not every kind of frantic humour or something
279
280
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unaccountable in a man’s actions, that points him out to be
such a madman as is to be exempted from punishment: it
must be that a man is totally deprived of his understanding
and memory, and does not know what he is doing, no more
than an infant, than a brute, or a wild beast, such a one is
never the object of punishment; therefore I must leave it to
your consideration, whether the condition this man was in,
as it is represented to you on one side, or the other, [shows]
a man, who knew what he was doing, and was able to
distinguish whether he was doing good or evil, and
understood what he did. . . . There you have a great many
circumstances about the buying of the powder and shot; his
going backward and forward; and if you believe he was
sensible, and had the use of his reason, and understood what
he did, then he is not within the exemptions of the law, but
is as subject to punishment as any other person.288
Read in isolation, certain passages could be interpreted as equating the
ability to grasp the basic nature of one’s acts with the ability to discern
between good and evil. But the evidence showed that Arnold had deliberately
shot Onslow for the purpose of killing him: Arnold threatened to kill
Onslow,289 carefully prepared his weapon and ammunition shortly before the
shooting,290 and carefully maneuvered around Onslow’s companions to
shoot Onslow and leave the others unharmed.291 A wolf might do the same:
hunt downwind, stalk its prey stealthily, and go for the throat. A child, too,
can carefully execute elaborate plans to get what the child wants and can
distinguish between cake and asparagus and between Fido and Mommy. Yet
a wolf—a wild beast and a “brute”—and a child lack the reason and
understanding of grown men and women and may not really know what they
are doing. The jury could have concluded from the evidence that Arnold
thought himself ridding the world of a wicked man who was determined to
“plague” and “bewitch” him, and in that sense lost “the use of reason” and
hence been unable to “distinguish whether he was doing good or evil, [or to]
underst[and] what he did.”292
Justice Kagan emphasized the portion of the instruction stating that if a
person was “deprived of his reason,” he was “consequently [deprived] of his
288
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intention [and] cannot be guilty.”293 First, moral and cognitive incapacity
stood as independent insanity excuses. Second, the judge had already
instructed the jury that the state had proved both that Arnold shot Onslow
and that he did it “wilfully,”294 which indicates the judge took cognitive
capacity as conclusively proved. If, as the judge also said, the question of
malice and sanity were yet to be answered, his remaining instructions must
have included or perhaps consisted of a moral incapacity test. His language
harkened to the early English writers’ close connection between the volitional
faculties and the cognitive and moral faculties. A person without reason was
without intention, not because the person lacked the cognitive capability to
decide upon and carry out a course of conduct based on an accurate
perception of physical reality, but because a person with only the basic
cognitive ability of a wild animal could not have a free will or make truly
voluntary choices.295 The assertion that “a madman” can have “no design”296
cannot have meant that Arnold did not understand that he was purchasing
ammunition, loading his gun, pointing it at a human being, and firing a shot
intended to be fatal. It must have meant that the loss of the higher human
powers of reason short of cognitive incapacity nevertheless negated criminal
responsibility by depriving a person of the moral inhibitions that guide the
conduct of mentally healthy adults.
b.

Rex v. Lord Ferrers (1760)

The Earl of Ferrers murdered John Johnson and was tried by his peers in
the House of Lords.297 Ferrers made an appointment with Johnson at Ferrers’
house and arranged to have most of the other occupants away.298 Ferrers
locked the door, he and Johnson argued, a maid heard Ferrers tell Johnson to
get on his knee and that it was his time to die, and then Ferrers shot him.299
Ferrers had Johnson sent upstairs to bed and called for a doctor, but then said
he would “shoot [Johnson] through the head.”300 When Johnson’s daughter
arrived, Ferrers told her he had killed her father “on purpose, and
deliberately.”301 He also told the doctor that he had “shot Mr. Johnson, and
293
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that he had done it coolly.”302 He also told the doctor which direction to look
for the bullet and demonstrated how he had held the pistol.303 In frustration,
he said that he had shot through a wooden board and wondered why the
bullet had not gone through Johnson’s body.304 The doctor recounted that
Ferrers had told him all about the shooting, saying he insisted Johnson sign
a confession of his various wrongs Ferrers believed he had done, that Johnson
refused, and therefore Ferrers shot him and was “quite cool” when he did it.305
“He said he had long intended to shoot him,” and that it was
“premeditated.”306
Justice Kagan’s discussion of Rex v. Ferrers does not take into account
these portions of the report. She focuses on the sections of the Solicitor’s
arguments addressing cognitive capacity.307 But the evidence and the closing
arguments on both sides include appeals to a moral incapacity excuse
independent of the modern version of the cognitive test.308
Ferrers submitted his closing arguments in writing and had the clerk read
them.309 His argument depended both upon moral incapacity and volitional
incapacity.310 He opened by stating that “the fact of Homicide is proved
against me by witnesses, who, for aught I can say to the contrary, speak
truly.”311 “But,” he continued, “if I know myself at this time, I can truly affirm,
302
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Lord Ferrers was indicted for murder, and set up the defence of partial
insanity, and showed by witnesses and medical testimony that he was
occasionally insane and at those times incapable of knowing what he did.
He appeared to be suffering from several unfounded delusions with
respect to the deceased. The murder was carried out with coolness and
deliberation. It appeared form the evidence that the prisoner at the time
he committed the crime had sufficient capacity to form a design and
know its consequences. The prosecution argued that complete
possession of reason was unnecessary to warrant judgment of the law,
and that it was sufficient if the party had such possession of reason as
enable him to comprehend the nature of his action, and discern the
difference between good and evil.
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310
Sendor, supra note 40, at 1379.
311
Ferrers, 19 How. St. Tr. at 944.
303

2020]

DUE PROCESS & THE INSANITY EXCUSE

69

I was ever incapable of it, knowingly: if I have done and said what has been
alleged, I must have been deprived of my senses.”312 The remainder of his
argument appeals to the moral incapacity defense. He argued that he was
sometimes “driven and hurried into [the] unhappy condition” of being “so
insane as not to know the difference between a moral and an immoral
action.”313 Never hinting that he did not know he was shooting a human being
for the purpose of killing him, Ferrers instead urged his “weak or
distemptered mind” and claimed that not he, but “passion, rage, [or]
madness” was responsible.314
The Solicitor General responded with closing arguments for the crown.
He first summarized Hale’s treatment of insanity, then set out the English
insanity excuse as he believed it to be:
If there be a total permanent want of reason, it will acquit the
prisoner. If there be a total temporary want of it, when the
offence was committed, it will acquit the prisoner: but if
there be only a partial degree of insanity, mixed with a partial
degree of reason; not a full and complete use of reason; but
(as lord Hale carefully and emphatically expresses himself) a
competent use of it, sufficient to have restrained those
passions, which produced the crime; if there be thought and
design; a faculty to distinguish the nature of actions; to
discern the difference between moral good and evil; then,
upon the fact of the offense proved, the judgment of the law
must take place.315
The Solicitor thus listed four components of mental ability
required to be held criminally responsible: sufficient mental power
to govern oneself (volitional capacity), sufficient mental ability to
plan and purpose, sufficient mental ability to discern what one is
doing (cognitive capacity), and sufficient mental capacity to
understand the morality of one’s acts (pure morality capacity).
Because the evidence clearly showed purpose and intent,316 the
Solicitor framed the question before the House of Lords in terms of
the moral incapacity test:

312
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My lords, the question therefore must be asked; is the noble
prisoner at the bar to be acquitted from the guilt of murder,
on account of insanity? It is not pretended to be a constant
general insanity. Was he under the power of it, at the time of
the offence committed? Could he, did he, at that time,
distinguish between good and evil?317
The evidence clearly showed Lord Ferrers’ cognitive capacity, but the
Solicitor General also argued that Ferrers had moral capacity. The only
evidence of insanity Ferrers could produce, he argued, was based on his
“temper and opinion.”318 He reminded the lords that one of Ferrers’ own
witnesses stated that Ferrers was “jealous and suspicious” but never unable
to “distinguish[] between good and evil” or to not know “that murder was a
great crime.”319 One of Ferrers’ brothers had failed to provide specific
instances to prove his assertion that, “at particular times, the noble lord might
not be able to distinguish between moral good and evil.”320 And Ferrers’
former attorney “thought lord Ferrers capable of distinguishing between
moral and immoral actions.”321
c.

Parr’s Case (1787)

Parr’s Case322 involved an accusation of fraud. Francis Parr was accused of
impersonating Isaac Hart in order to receive payments Hart was due.323 Parr’s
entire defense was that he had fallen overboard while at sea and had
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consequently suffered fits of insanity during which he did not know what he
did and of which he could remember nothing afterward.324 Because he
claimed only cognitive incapacity, the judge’s instructions focused on his
understanding what he did. Impersonation, the judge told the jury, was a
crime that required skill and demonstrated cognitive capacity.325 It also
generally showed a “wicked discretion,” but the defendant could be excused
if the jury concluded that his acts resulted from “the impulse of the moment
arising from a disordered mind, without attending to the consequences [i.e.
criminal penalties], and without having knowledge enough at that time to
form a criminal intention.”326 But it was “difficult to conceive that he should
take the necessary steps, [and] write the name of Isaac Hart, both in the book
and the warrant, if he did not know that he was then about to write the name
of another person.”327
However, the first half of his instructions smacked of moral incapacity.
The judge instructed the jury that a person “incapable of distinguishing
between right and wrong, good and evil, and the necessary tendency of his
own actions,” must be acquitted.328 Leaving aside any question of mere
cognitive capacity, he told the jury that evidence of insanity must be clear
because sometimes those who lead very upright lives commit a crime, and
their sensitive consciences—which must operate based on what the criminals
know they have done—produce symptoms that could be mistaken for a form
of insanity that might lead the jury to conclude that they were not moral
agents and were unable to “discern[] between good and evil.”329
d.

Hadfield’s Case (1800)

The arguments and instructions in Hadfield’s Case330 lend even stronger
support to the argument of this article than those of Arnold and Ferrers
because Hadfield was acquitted even though he demonstrably knew what he
was doing when he committed the murder. Hadfield was charged with
treason for attempting to assassinate King George III.331 He went to the Royal
Theatre at Drury Lane, chose a position from which he could see the royal
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box, and, during the performance, stood up and shot at the king.332
Fortunately, he missed.333
Noting that Hadfield had deliberately gone to the theater, and implying
that the shot was an intentional act,334 the Attorney General stated the English
law of insanity:
I apprehend, that according to the law of this country, if a
man is completely deranged, so that he knows not what he
does, if a man is so lost to all sense, in consequence of the
infirmity of disease, that he is incapable of distinguishing
between good and evil—that he is incapable of forming a
judgment upon the consequences of the act which he is about
to do, that then the mercy of our law says, he cannot be guilty
of a crime.335
He explained that a person unconscious of his acts, whether because of a
fever or insanity, could not distinguish right from wrong and therefore was
not criminally responsible.336 Other persons of weak understanding were to
be held accountable if they possessed enough mental ability to “discern good
from evil,”337 which was to be measured in the same way that a jury
determined whether a child had sufficient capacity to be held accountable:
[I]t is not the age of the child, but the capacity of the child,
and you judge of it principally from that which he did at the
moment of the fact with which he stands charged; for
instance, if a child having done a criminal act, shows a
consciousness that he has done wrong; if he endeavours to
conceal it; if he does that which demonstrates that although
he had not a complete view of the subject—he did not
understand the enormity of his guilt—he did not see it in all
its consequences as a person possessed of a complete mature
understanding would do—yet if he possessed that degree of
sense which enabled him to judge whether the act which he
was committing was right or wrong, that has constantly been
held sufficient to induce a jury to find infants of very tender
years guilty of offenses. . . . [T]he law of this country states it
332
333
334
335
336
337
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to be [the same] in the case of persons labouring under that
disorder which is commonly called lunacy.338
After two hundred years, the eloquence of Lord Thomas Erskine,
Hadfield’s defense attorney, still twinkles on the page. Agreeing with the
Attorney General that civil and criminal insanity tests were distinct,339 and
almost as though anticipating the kinds of arguments Kansas would make
centuries later, Erskine noted that Hale and Coke’s statements were extreme
and untenable if interpreted strictly.340 Only on rare occasions is a person
almost completely without mental power; in others, “reason is not driven
from her seat, but distraction sits down upon it along with her, holds her,
trembling, upon it, and frightens her from her propriety.”341 Erskine
proposed that a person was legally insane and not criminally responsible if
the criminal act was the result of a delusion that distorted the criminal’s view
of reality.342 Such delusional versions of reality could include complete
distortions of basic realities, or they could be delusions about the identity of
the criminal or his victim,343 the latter of which would fit squarely within the
moral incapacity test.
Erskine distinguished between the modern cognitive and moral incapacity
tests. He found fault with the Attorney General’s formulation of the moral
incapacity test, through which a person was acquitted if he lacked “the
knowledge of good and evil.”344 Erskine explained that a person might
murder his victim while under the delusion that the victim was a piece of
pottery or a wild animal, and yet not fall within the knowledge-of-good-andevil test because in all other respects he was sane and knew the principles of
morality.345 He thus, while criticizing a formulation of the moral incapacity
test, clearly distinguished between the pure moral incapacity test and the
cognitive incapacity test, noting while he did so that cognitive incapacity
engenders moral incapacity. Erskine did not denounce the moral incapacity
excuse, upon which he hung his case, but criticized a particular formulation
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of it.346 Hadfield, though he intended to kill the king, whom he knew to be a
human being, was delusional, on that account could not tell right from
wrong, and therefore deserved acquittal.347
Erskine anticipated presenting witnesses to prove that Hadfield, as a result
of wounds incurred during military service,348 delusionally believed himself
to be a savior, and that he must be killed to save the world.349 Rather than
simply dispatch himself, he decided to murder the king, for which he knew
he would surely be caught and hanged. After the prosecution put on its case
and Erskine had made considerable progress in presenting the defense, the
judge interposed. Was Erskine quite finished? No, he had “twenty more
witnesses to examine.”350 Because the Attorney General had no witnesses to
counter the testimony Erskine produced, the judge more or less told the
Attorney General the case was over.351 Erskine said he agreed with the
Attorney General’s statement of the law, the Attorney General agreed that
Erskine had proved his case, and the judge, Lord Kenyon, put the case to
rest.352 As a matter of form, the jury promptly returned a verdict of not guilty
by reason of insanity.353 Because everyone agreed that Hadfield knew he was
attempting to assassinate the king, the only way Hadfield could have been
acquitted was if Lord Kenyon, Erskine, and the Attorney General all agreed
that the insanity excuse was broader than cognitive incapacity.
e.

Parker’s Case (1812)

Parker’s Case was a treason case.354 Parker, a British marine, was captured
by the French and imprisoned on the Isle of France.355 He deserted to the
French to gain his freedom. He told a French sentry that he, Parker, was going

346
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to join the sentry’s side.356 He joined the French army and tried to get a fellow
British soldier to do the same.357 A witness who had known Parker growing
up testified that he was of “very weak intellect[]” and that his friends and
neighbors were surprised he was allowed to join the army.358 In the face of all
the evidence showing that Parker understood the nature of his acts (getting
out of prison, joining the French military, putting on a French uniform and
drawing French pay), Parker’s attorney appealed to the jury to acquit Parker
based on his poor mental abilities.359 The Attorney General accepted that, in
light of the evidence of Parker’s sanity and clear understanding, the jury
could acquit Parker if it was “perfectly satisfied, that at the time when the
crime was committed, the prisoner did not really know right from wrong.”360
Given the evidence of Parker’s cognitive abilities, the Attorney General must
have been conceding moral incapacity as an independent insanity excuse.
f.

Bellingham’s Case (1812)

John Bellingham shot and killed the Prime Minister, Spencer Perceval.361
While in Russia on business, Bellingham was thrown into prison.362 He
believed he was imprisoned unjustly, but the British government refused to
help.363 Back in England, he sought redress in vain.364 He went so far as to
apply for Parliamentary aid, but the law required Prime Minister Perceval’s
consent first, and Perceval refused to give it.365 Bellingham shot Perceval as
the Prime Minister walked into the House of Commons.366
The Attorney General ended his opening statement by arguing that
Bellingham was quite sane enough for the jury to convict him. First, he
356
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managed his own affairs and none of his friends or family attempted to take
out a commission of lunacy against him.367 Second, others employed him to
manage their business affairs.368 Ignoring Hale’s point that insanity may be
total or partial and Erskine’s discussion of delusions, the Attorney General
argued that since Bellingham could have written a valid will the morning of
the murder, he must be held accountable for the killing.369 If any killer could
base his insanity defense on the absurdity of his acts or his inability to judge
between right and wrong, he said, every murderous act would be its own
insanity defense.370 Then he narrowed the question before the jury: “the only
question upon the point of sanity or insanity, that can be presented to your
consideration upon the present trial, is this, namely, whether the Prisoner
was capable or incapable of distinguishing right from wrong.”371 He noted
that civil law required more mental powers than did the criminal law; a man
cannot validly transact his own business unless he understands his affairs, but
a person could commit murder if his sanity rendered him “incapable of
distinguishing right from wrong.”372
The famous Lord Chief Justice Mansfield gave the jury instructions. It was
clear that Bellingham had killed Perceval and had done so on purpose.373 But
a man would be excused if he were “deprived of all power of reasoning, so as
not to be able to distinguish whether it was right or wrong to commit the
most wicked transaction.”374 Justice Mansfield then said that the defendant
had the burden of proving “beyond all doubt” that “he did not consider that
murder was a crime against the laws of God and nature.”375 A person
“[de]void of all power of reasoning from . . . birth” was excused, but a person
subject to fits of lunacy could be held responsible if, at the time of the crime,
the person could “distinguish good from evil.”376 If the defendant was
deluded into thinking he was unjustly wronged and was justified in seeking
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revenge, but could otherwise distinguish between right and wrong, the jury
could not acquit.377
Mansfield’s instructions represent a broad form of the moral incapacity
excuse and included both forms, the pure moral and legal-moral
formulations. A severe cognitive incapacity—one that would defeat the
modern mens rea for murder—would lead to moral incapacity and therefore
relieve the defendant of criminal responsibility,378 but Bellingham suffered
from no such mental defect. The operational instruction was the final form
of insanity Mansfield described. A delusion that prevented the killer from
discerning right from wrong with respect to a particular act would not excuse
his conduct, but a general inability to understand and apply both the laws of
morality and the laws of the government would.379 Based on that rule and the
evidence that Bellingham was sane on every point except his delusional
obsession with revenge against Perceval, the jury convicted him, and he was
sentenced to death.380
Although Mansfield’s instructions were inconsistent with the law as stated
in Hadfield’s Case and Bowler’s Case, they showed a clear commitment to a
moral incapacity excuse independent of severe cognitive incapacity.
Mansfield may have been influenced by the sensational nature of the case and
the public stature of the victim.381 His statement of the moral incapacity
excuse seems calculated to obtain a conviction of the Prime Minister’s killer
while preserving an independent moral incapacity excuse.
g.

Bowler’s Case (1812)

Less than two months later, on July 1, 1812, Thomas Bowler was tried for
the attempted murder of William Burrows.382 As Burrows was driving to the
London Market, Bowler came up to his cart, aimed a blunderbuss at him, said
“d[am]n your eyes,” and fired.383 Earlier that morning, Bowler and his
grandson brought a fast horse to a blacksmith’s shop near the road to
London.384 Bowler said loudly to the blacksmith that he thought his
377
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blunderbuss was broken but privately told him he was going to shoot a dog
and did not want his grandson to know.385 Bowler left his grandson near the
blacksmith’s, positioned himself behind a large tree beside the road,
ambushed Burrows, and escaped on the horse with his grandson.386 About a
week later, he was arrested at his home.387
The blacksmith testified that Bowler’s manner was normal and that he was
“very cool and deliberate.”388 A stable-keeper by the name of William
Shepherd testified that, a few months before, Bowler swore he would kill
Burrows.389 When Shepherd protested, Bowler cursed and repeated his vow
to kill Burrows in June.390
Other testimony showed that he suffered from epilepsy and had become
greatly disturbed after a fit in mid-1811, which came on while he was in a
hay-field with Mr. Burrows.391 Subsequently, Bowler said that he, Bowler, was
a madman and that he suffered from delusions about losing his estate for
failure to pay his taxes properly.392 He lost his ability to count money, too.393
He fancied he had seen the dead in underground caves, while playing cards
did not realize that he was doing so, ate raw meat for breakfast, and
sometimes spoke incoherently.394 He was sufficiently lucid at one point to
make a valid will,395 but the prison doctor testified that Bowler was insane.396
He also confirmed that Bowler was deluded into thinking Burrows was intent
on harming him, but otherwise “kn[ew] the consequences of his actions,
and . . . whether his actions were right or wrong.”397 The prosecutor's final
question to the prison doctor is quite revealing because it shows he assumed
Bowler knew, at the time of the crime, that he was trying to shoot Burrows:
“do you know whether he was sensible of his killing and shooting Mr.
Barrows [sic] was a wrong thing?” The doctor’s reply was equally telling
because even though it showed he thought Bowler did not know that he had
shot Burrows, it addresses cognitive and moral capacity separately and
385
386
387
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independently: “I don’t think he had any idea he had shot Mr. Burrows, or,
that he had been doing a wrong thing.”398
The judge, Lord Simon Le Blanc, charged the jury with both cognitive and
moral incapacity tests. Bowler should be acquitted only if he “was not capable
of distinguishing right from wrong” or if he suffered from a delusion that
made him “insensible of the nature of the act he was about to commit.”399 But
if the defendant was “capable of distinguishing right from wrong, and not
under the influence of such an illusion as disabled him from discerning, that
he was doing a wrong act,” he was guilty.400 The jury returned a guilty verdict,
most likely because they determined he understood he was shooting at a
human and because even if Bowler’s delusion regarding Burrows’ alleged
conspiracy to have him thrown in jail were true, Bowler was able to know
that murder was the wrong way to go about frustrating Burrows’ plan.
h.

Rex v. Offord (1831)

Rex v. Offord401 was like Bowler’s Case in that Offord, like, Bowler, was
deluded into believing that the victim and others were conspiring to “deprive
him of his liberty and life.”402 After the murder, various papers were found
on his person, including a “List of Hadleigh conspirators against my life” and
a summons with the note reading as follows: “This is the beginning of an
attempt against my life.”403 Doctors testified that he suffered from
monomania and “might not [have been] aware that, in firing the gun, his act
involved the crime of murder.”404 The judge, citing Bellingham’s Case,
instructed the jury that even if Offord knew the shot would be fatal, the jury
must be convinced that Offord knew “he was committing an offence against
the laws of God and nature.”405 Like Lord Mansfield, Lord Lyndhurst adopted
a clear moral incapacity excuse not dependent on cognitive incapacity.
Although the evidence showed he was deliberately killing a person he
delusionally believed was hounding him, the jury acquitted on the ground of
insanity406—undoubtedly on the ground of moral incapacity.
398
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Regina v. Oxford (1840)

Regina v. Oxford407 involved a charge of treason for Oxford’s attempted
assassination of Queen Victoria.408 The Attorney General opened by
recounting the evidence to be produced of the careful steps Oxford took to
procure pistols, powder, and bullets, his lying in wait for the queen’s carriage,
and deliberately taking aim and firing at her twice.409 When bystanders
initially seized someone else, Oxford said, “It was me, I did it, I surrender
myself.”410 The Attorney General said that the prisoner would be guilty if the
jury concluded that he was “able to distinguish right from wrong, in his own
case, and to know that he was doing wrong in the act which he committed.”411
After clarifying Hale’s strong language and citing the major cases discussed
here, the Attorney General declined to rely on Bellingham’s Case because of
“doubts as to the correctness of the mode in which that case was conducted.412
He cited Rex v. Ferrers for the proposition that the criminal law was satisfied
if Oxford “could discriminate between good and evil.”413
Oxford’s defense attorney noted that Oxford delusionally believed himself
to be a part of a political society whose existence could not be verified.414 The
prosecution responded first by acknowledging that if the jury found the
pistols were loaded with bullets, there could be no dispute that Oxford’s
object was to kill the queen.415 He then conceded that the appropriate test was
whether the prisoner knew “he was committing an offence against the law of
God and nature.”416 He interpreted this test as including cognitive and legalmoral incapacity, saying that the question before the jury was “whether the
prisoner, at the time he did the act, was in a situation to know right from
wrong—to know that the act was one calculated to inflict death, and that its
performance would subject him to punishment.”417
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The prosecution explained that Oxford’s alleged insanity would not excuse
him unless it caused the criminal act by destroying either his cognitive or
moral capacity relative to the act of shooting at the queen:
Mark, therefore, the connexion, as Mr. Erskine put it, of the
delusion with the act. If the prisoner in this case did the act,
knowing it was a guilty act, for the sake of public notoriety,
he is responsible, and must be found guilty. It is evident he
knew he was breaking the laws of God; let us see whether he
knew that he was liable to punishment. His answers before
the Privy Council sh[o]w that there was no imbecility. What
you will have to say, therefore, will be, whether the prisoner
was under any delusion when he committed the act, which
delusion alters the character of the act. If he thought he was
doing an innocent act, and did not know that he was doing
an illegal act which would subject him to criminal
punishment, he must be acquitted; but otherwise, not.418
The Chief Justice, Lord Denman, instructed the jury on moral incapacity
and expressly referred to it as “moral insanity.”419 Addressing evidence of the
defendant’s grandfather’s alleged insanity, he gave a volitional incapacity test
founded on the relationship between the will and the rational faculties.420
Drawing upon cognitive and moral incapacity concepts and the language of
the prosecution, he ended by telling the jury that the defendant would be
excused if “he was quite unaware of the nature, character, and consequences
of the act he was committing, or, in other words, whether he was under the
influence of a diseased mind, and was really unconscious at the time he was
committing the act, that it was a crime.”421 Understanding the nature of the
act depends on cognitive capacity; understanding the character of the act can
be reasonably interpreted to depend on both cognitive and pure moral
capacity; and understanding the consequences of one’s act, which hearkens
to the prosecution’s legal-moral incapacity language, depends on the ability
to understand that society disapproves of an act and will punish it.422
The jury returned a verdict of not-guilty grounded jointly on insufficient
evidence that the pistols were loaded and sufficient evidence that Oxford was
insane.423 They were told to retire and return a special verdict on each
418
419
420
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question.424 They returned shortly thereafter with a verdict of not guilty by
reason of insanity.425
j.

M’Naghten’s Case (1843)

Daniel M’Naghten lent his name, though perhaps not its correct
spelling,426 to the most famous of the modern formulations of the insanity
excuse. M’Naghten’s Case427 served as the occasion for the great English
jurists of the day to unambiguously articulate the English insanity excuse.
M’Naghten was charged with shooting “a certain pistol of the value of 20”
shillings at Edward Drummond, from which Drummond received “one
mortal wound,” “languished” for several months, and died.428
Medical testimony was presented to the effect that an otherwise sane
person might be “affected by morbid delusions,” and that such a delusion had
deprived M’Naghten of his “moral perception of right and wrong” and his
self-control in matters relating to the delusion.429 Lord Chief Justice Tindal
instructed the jury on an insanity excuse closely parallel to the instructions
discussed above:
The question to be determined is, whether at the time the act
in question was committed, the prisoner had or had not the
use of his understanding, so as to know that he was doing a
wrong or wicked act. If the jurors should be of the opinion
that the prisoner was not sensible, at the time he committed
it, that he was violating the laws both of God and man, then
he would be entitled to a verdict in his favour.430
When the jury acquitted him, the House of Lords debated the insanity
excuse and requested some of the highest judges of the land to answer several
questions regarding existing English insanity law.431 Justice Tindal answered
for fourteen of the fifteen judges, concluding that the insanity excuse would
relieve a defendant from responsibility only if,
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Daniel M’Naghten’s Case (1843), 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200.
428
Id. at 719, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 200–01.
429
Id., 10 Cl. & Fin. at 201.
430
Id. at 719–20, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 202.
431
Id. at 720, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 202.
425
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at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of
the mind, as [1] not to know the nature and quality of the act
he was doing; or, if he did know it, [2] that he did not know
he was doing what was wrong. The mode of putting the latter
part of the question to the jury on these occasions has
generally been, whether the accused at the time of doing the
act knew the difference between right and wrong.432
This formulation, which reflected the justices’ view of existing English law
rather than a new insanity excuse, includes separate cognitive and moral
incapacity components. Tindal recognized that the phrase “knew the
difference between right and wrong” was not merely an extension of the
cognitive incapacity test but had been an independent excuse for centuries.
The M’Naghten test, with its independent cognitive and moral incapacity
prongs, was not a new test, but an articulation of the English insanity excuse
as it had existed for generations. Justice Maule, the only justice who disagreed
with Justice Tindal’s exposition of the law, did so on the ground that jury
instructions were a matter of discretion for the trial court.433 His statement of
the insanity excuse, taken in context, was a verbatim repetition of the pure
moral incapacity excuse.434
k.

Summary

This discussion of the early English cases disproves Justice Kagan’s
assertion that English judges “[threw] everything against the wall . . . without
trying to order, prioritize, or even distinguish among them.”435 Contrary to
the Kahler majority’s analysis, the jury instructions and attorneys’ arguments
in every single case discussed above show that the English legal system had
firmly established the moral incapacity excuse as a separate and independent
ground for relieving a defendant from criminal liability. There can be no
question that the cases adopted insanity tests that went beyond the cognitive
incapacity excuse, with some even using volitional incapacity, either as its
own test or as a theoretical justification for the cognitive and moral incapacity
tests.

432
433

Id. at 722, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 210.
Daniel M’Naghten’s Case (1843), 8 Eng. Rep. 718, at 720–21, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, at 204–

06.
434
Id. at 721, 10 Cl. & Fin. at 205 (“To render a person irresponsible for crime on account
of unsoundness of mind, the unsoundness should, according to the law as it has long been
understood and held, be such as rendered him incapable of knowing right from wrong.”).
435
Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1034 (2020)
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Pre-M’Naghten British Writers

British writers who wrote after the early English works discussed above
but whose works appeared before M’Naghten’s Case discussed separate
cognitive and moral incapacity excuses. Some of these works were legal in
nature, while others combined law and medicine. Several examples of these
works demonstrate that the moral incapacity excuse was widely recognized
before the famous M’Naghten test was formulated in 1843. The insane could
provide testimony only if they understood the “moral obligation” of an
oath,436 and the same concepts of moral capacity were at play in the
substantive criminal law as well.
a.

John Shapland Stock

John Shapland Stock’s Practical Treatise on the Law of Non Compotes
Mentis accepted the moral incapacity excuse but argued that pure moral
incapacity should be abandoned in favor of legal-moral incapacity.437 An
insane person could either be generally incapable of understanding “the
nature of his Acts,” or incapable of understanding the nature of specific
acts.438 The jury instructions from several key English cases indicated that a
person would be excused from criminal liability if the person had basic
cognitive capacity but were “unconscious[] that it [was] a violation of the
Laws of God and Nature,” or the laws of morality.439 Stock argued that pure
moral incapacity was a flawed test because laws do not always depend on
“abstract right and wrong.”440 Instead, society’s wellbeing depended on
holding everyone accountable who could understand that society
disapproved of his conduct and imposed punishment for it.441 Stock’s
argument assumed the cognitive incapacity excuse and argued about the
separate incapacity excuse, saying the legal-moral incapacity excuse was
superior to the pure moral incapacity excuse.

436

JOSEPH CHITTY, 1 A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 588 (Thomas
Huntington ed., 1832) (noting that any insane person with “a due sense of moral obligation”
could be competent to testify). Chitty was an English attorney. The edition cited here was
published in New York and Philadelphia.
437
JOHN SHAPLAND STOCK, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NON COMPOTES MENTIS
39–40 (1839). Each page contains an earlier edition’s pagination in brackets, but I cite to the
pagination of the 1839 edition. Stock was a barrister of the Middle Temple in England.
438
Id. at 38.
439
Id. at 39.
440
Id. at 39.
441
Id.
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J. M. Pagan

J. M. Pagan published a series of his lectures on forensic medicine in
1840.442 Although he disclaimed full knowledge of the legal aspects of
insanity,443 he did discuss it. He cited a Scottish treatise for the proposition
that a criminal defendant would be excused on the ground of insanity only if
the defendant’s insanity was “of such a kind as entirely deprived him of the
use of reason . . . and the knowledge that he was doing wrong in committing
it.”444 He also cited the moral incapacity test from Bellingham’s Case.445 He
then cited the Scottish treatise again to show that, although imagined hurts
and insults would not justify a killing if true, an insane delusion consisting of
imagined wrongs that would justify a killing if true could excuse the
defendant even if he “was perfectly aware that murder in general was a
crime.”446 Pagan criticized the moral incapacity excuse, which he took to be
established English law, on medical and evidentiary grounds.447
Pagan recounted a Scottish murder and the intellectual capacities of the
murderer, a man named Barclay, whom he had examined in his role as a
physician. Although the murderer had severe cognitive deficiencies, Pagan’s
account credits him with understanding human life and killing and the fear
of punishment from the authorities, but little or no sense of the moral
rightness or wrongness of actions.448 Pagan explained that “[a]ll the[]
circumstances seem clearly to show, that Barclay, imbecile as he was, was
capable of forming the design of murder, of executing his purpose secretly,
and of endeavouring, by flight and falsehood, to free himself from the
consequences of his act.”449 Nevertheless, “he seemed to have no internal
impression of the difference between right and wrong.”450 The jury convicted
him on the testimony of doctors who believed Barclay was an imbecile but
“knew the distinction between right and wrong” and that “murder was a
crime.”451 Pagan’s account can reasonably be read as implying that where
cognitive capacity is not in question, proof of moral capacity defeated the
insanity defense.
442
443
444
445
446
447
448
449
450
451

J.M. PAGAN, THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY iii (1840).
Id.
Id. at 3 (citation omitted).
Id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
Id. at 6, 13–14, 285, 305–06.
J.M. PAGAN, THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 307–11 (1840).
Id. at 311.
Id. at 310.
Id. at 312.
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Leonard Shelford

Leonard Shelford wrote his Practical Treatise on the Law Concerning
Lunatics, Idiots, and Persons of Unsound Mind in 1833. His chapter on crimes
by and against lunatics opened with a clear statement of the cognitive and
moral incapacity excuses.452 Citing Rex v. Ferrers, he noted that the
prosecution’s statements contained a dual cognitive and moral incapacity
test.453 After summarizing some of the key English cases discussed above, he
recounted the trial of Jonathan Martin for burning a cathedral. Martin
believed he had dreams from God telling him to burn the cathedral.454
Although he knew he was setting fire to the cathedral when he did it, he was
found not guilty by reason of insanity.455 Because the testimony showed he
knew he was setting fire to another’s property, the jury could have only
acquitted him on the ground of moral incapacity brought on by insane
delusions.456
d.

Anthony Highmore

Anthony Highmore published his Treatise on the Law of Idiocy and
Lunacy on both sides of the Atlantic. The treatise was largely a regurgitation
of the early English writers and a few then-contemporary cases, including
Hadfield’s Case.457 Highmore specifically wrote that the insane should not be
prosecuted “because they [lack] knowledge to distinguish between good and
evil.”458 He also wrote that a man might be insane, yet commit a criminal act
“with premeditation” and “under the dominion of mischief and malice” for
which he would be responsible.459 That description includes both cognitive
452

LEONARD SHELFORD, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW CONCERNING LUNATICS,
IDIOTS, AND PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND 458 (1833) (“T[he] essence of a crime consists in the
animus or intention of the person who commits it, considered as a free agent, and in a
capacity of distinguishing between moral good and evil.”).
453
Id. at 458–59.
454
Id. at 465–66,.
455
Id. at 467.
456
Insanity law and religious liberty meet at the invisible border between psychological
problems and religious fanaticism. Lawyers, legislators, and psychiatric experts ought to be
wary of attributing religious views with which they disagree to a disordered mind. See Stuart
Schoffman, “Insane on the Subject of Judaism”: Pursuing the Ghost of Warder Cresson, 94
JEWISH Q. REV. 318 (2004) (recounting the story of Walter Cresson, whose wife attempted to
take his property by taking out a commission of lunacy against him when he converted to
Judaism and became an avid Zionist).
457
See ANTHONY HIGHMORE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF IDIOCY AND LUNACY 138–56
(First American ed., 1822).
458
Id. at 138.
459
Id. at 151.
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and moral language. Furthermore, Highmore’s account of Hadfield’s Case
included all the facts showing that Hadfield had full possession of his basic
cognitive faculties, knowing what it was to kill a human and knowing that he
could do it with a pistol and knowing that the king was the head of state.460
Highmore must have realized that the Chief Justice and the jury could only
have concluded Hadfield was not guilty by reason of insanity if the English
insanity excuse was broader than cognitive incapacity.
4.

Pre-M’Naghten American Writers

The American writers, relying on English authorities, set forth in their
treatises and articles an insanity excuse that included both cognitive and
moral incapacity prongs and were based on the connection between the
rational and volitional powers. Some writers discussed only the medical or
philosophical aspects of moral incapacity and limited their discussions of the
legal aspect to questions of public policy. 461 Others, discussed below,462 show
that the moral incapacity excuse was widely accepted in American legal
practice before M’Naghten.463
a.

Matthew Bacon, Henry Gwillim, and Bird Wilson

Matthew Bacon’s New Abridgment of the Law was added to by Henry
Gwillim, and the American judge Bird Wilson added new English and
American cases and had it published in Philadelphia in the early nineteenth
century. The section on the criminal responsibility of the mentally disturbed
is fairly short, but it opened with a statement of the insanity defense that
smacks of moral incapacity: “[I]diots and lunaticks being by reason of their
natural disability incapable of judging between good and evil, are punishable
by no criminal prosecution whatsoever.”464 It closed by distinguishing
between civil and criminal liability for “trespass against the person or
possession of another”; a person who “wants discretion” was civilly, but not
criminally liable.465 The common law tort of battery required intent to make
460

Id. at 151–54.
E.g. RUSH, supra note 3, at 357–67.
462
The authors discussed below were chosen primarily as representative examples, not
because they necessarily were the most widely respected or widely read authorities of their
day. But their positions are consistent, not only with the argument this article makes, but
with the views of their contemporaries.
463
Platt & Diamond, supra note 216, at 1250. Platt and Diamond point out that few
writers, if any, criticized the moral incapacity excuse prior to 1843. Id.
464
MATTHEW BACON, 3 A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 535 (Bird Wilson ed., 1813). The
original pagination is indicated in brackets on the side of each page, and that pagination is
reflected here.
465
Id. at 536.
461
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contact with another person, which a person with mere cognitive capacity
can do, whereas a person needs moral capacity in order to intend that the
contact be wrongful.466 A person with the cognitive capacity to form intent
may nevertheless lack “discretion” and be unable to understand the moral or
legal implications of his action. Hence, a person with the cognitive capacity
to be liable in tort for a battery could, in a criminal case, raise the defense of
moral incapacity based on a lack of discretion.
b.

Thomas Cooper

Thomas Cooper’s Tracts on Medical Jurisprudence, published in
Philadelphia in 1819, included only three pages of his own writing on the
medical aspects of insanity.467 But Cooper included the English physician
Haslam’s work on mental disturbances and the law.468 Haslam’s discussion of
lawyers’ questions about whether particular defendants could discern
between right and wrong treats the question as a matter involving both moral
and cognitive faculties.469

466
E.g. Wagner v. Utah Dep’t of Human Servs., 122 P.3d 599, 603–04 (Utah 2005) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 8(A) and 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1965)).
467
THOMAS COOPER, TRACTS ON MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 66–68 (1819).
468
Id. at 281.
469
JOHN HASLAM, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE AS IT RELATES TO INSANITY 12–13 (1817).
Haslam wrote:
If violence be inflicted by such a person during a paroxysm of rage, there
is no acuteness of metaphysical investigation which can trace the
succession of his thoughts, and the impulses by which he is goaded for
the accomplishment of his purpose. And it will be [shown] hereafter that
in some instances he is not himself conscious of his actions.
....
His belief in the GOOD of his principle, his faith in the RIGHT of his
actions, are superior to arguments,—his motive cannot be controlled by
reason, or baffled by the fear of punishment. Impressed with a belief in
the truth of his delusion, he hurries forward to its accomplishment: and
in the pursuit of the phantom cannot be diverted by the most awful
consequences.
....
A person in his sense may entertain and believe a number of unfounded
and erroneous opinions, but on the exposure of their falsity he is capable
of being convinced, but the madman never is; and this forms the great
distinction between them. This incapability of being convinced of the
GOOD and EVIL, RIGHT and WRONG, TRUTH and FALSEHOOD of his
BELIEF is that, which as an intellectual being, renders him different from
other men, and constitutes his distemper.

2020]

DUE PROCESS & THE INSANITY EXCUSE
c.

89

Charles Humphreys

Summarizing the common law of Kentucky in 1822, Charles Humphreys
justified the infancy and insanity excuses on the same grounds. He essentially
restated Blackstone as the common law of Kentucky.470 Children under seven
were not responsible because they could not “discriminat[e] good from
evil.”471 Children between seven and fourteen were responsible if found to be
doli capax and able to “discern good from evil.”472 He repeated Blackstone’s
accounts of the execution of several children executed for murder because
“[t]heir conduct was considered a manifestation of a sense of guilt.”473 His
treatment of idiocy and lunacy likewise mirrored Blackstone’s, which, as
discussed above, included a moral incapacity component.474
d.

William Russell

The American edition of William Russell’s Treatise on Crimes and
Misdemeanors was edited by Daniel Davies and published in 1824. Russell,
like Blackstone, founded criminal culpability on volitional capacity and
linked the cognitive and moral faculties to the volitional faculties.475 Children
of fourteen were held accountable for capital crimes as adults because “the
law presumes them at those years to be doli capaces, and able to discern
between good and evil.”476 On the subject of insanity, Russell gave the
traditional distinction between idiots and lunatics, along with some other
remarks, and then recounted several of the major English cases on the
insanity defense.477
He then tackled head-on the “right and wrong” language of those cases
and expressly tied them to the defendant’s awareness of moral and legal
principles. The ability to “distinguish right from wrong,” the ability to
“discern that he was doing a wrong act,” being “totally deprived of his
Id. at 14, 20–21, 23–24. He also treats those who believe they are ordered by God to
murder their friends as unable to discern between right and wrong. Id. at 37–38.
These cases fall outside the modern mens rea approach but squarely within the
moral incapacity excuse. E.g. People v. Serravo, 823 P.2d 128, 139 (Colo. 1992) (en
banc).
470
See CHARLES HYMPHREYS, A COMPENDIUM OF THE COMMON LAW IN FORCE IN
KENTUCKY 464–65 (1822) (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 205, at *21, *23–25, *27).
471
Id. at 464.
472
Id.
473
Id. (citations omitted).
474
Id. at 464–65; supra notes 256–268 and accompanying text.
475
RUSSELL, supra note 263, at 1–2.
476
Id. at 4.
477
Id. at 8–18 (citations omitted).
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understanding and memory,” and Hadfield’s statements at his interrogation
and trial all concern whether the defendant was “aware that he was doing a
wrong act.”478 Russell concluded that Hadfield knew he was doing wrong, but
conceded that “the degree of its criminality might have been but imperfectly
presented to him, through the morbid delusion by which his senses and
understanding were affected.”479 He believed that the proper insanity test was
reflected in the formulation adopted by the prosecution in Rex v. Ferrers, that
the defendant was responsible only if he possessed “thought and design, a
faculty to distinguish the nature of actions, to discern the difference between
moral good and evil.”480
e.

Peter Oxendine Thacher

Peter Oxendine Thacher, a Massachusetts judge, delivered several charges
to grand juries in Suffolk, Massachusetts, and later had them printed. In the
written version of his 1835 charge, Thacher declared that those with a
defective will were punishable for their crimes.481 Immaturity of
understanding resulting from infancy usually caused such a defect, but a
child under fourteen years old was responsible if the child “possessed
sufficient discretion to distinguish between moral good and evil.”482
Imbecility, too, provided an excuse if it caused “an incapacity to distinguish
between right and wrong.”483 Another part of his charge drew upon volitional
and moral incapacity concepts.484
Thacher’s discussion dwelled mostly on cognitive capacity, but the
language quoted above is demonstrably broader than the mens rea approach.
Explaining the principles he had expounded, Thacher wrote that one species
of insanity that would excuse a defendant in a murder case was different only

478

Id. at 18.
Id.
480
Id. (citation omitted).
481
PETER OXENDINE THACHER, A CHARGE TO THE GRAND JURY OF THE COUNTY OF SUFFOLK
17 (1835). The grand juries typically requested Thacher to have them printed, perhaps as a
delicate way of allowing him to have them printed without seeming self-aggrandizing.
482
Id. at 17–18.
483
Id. at 18.
484
Id. at 25 (“For as it would be a great reflection upon the public justice, that an
innocent man should be convicted; it would be equally unjust, and contrary to the principle
of public punishment, that one, deprived of his reason by the act of Providence, and without
the power of choosing between right and wrong, should, for an act done at such time, and
under such circumstances, be punished as a criminal.”).
479
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in “duration” from passionate bitterness against another.485 That is, in one
case, the resentment was caused by an insane delusion and the offender was
not responsible; in the other, the resentment was caused by voluntary
meditation on perceived wrongs, and the offender was responsible. Only an
insanity excuse considerably broader than cognitive incapacity could explain
that result.
f.

Isaac Ray

Isaac Ray’s Treatise on the Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity was published
multiple times on both sides of the Atlantic, before and after M’Naghten’s
Case. In the 1839 edition, Ray found no reason to hold criminally responsible
an insane person who murders a person for the same silly reasons he might
kill an animal because such a person “is constitutionally unable to appreciate
any difference in the moral character of the two actions.”486 He lacks this
capacity because natural rights and “the sentiment of wrong” are as far from
his mind as complex math.487 He might competently perform various acts but
be a “stranger to that high moral power which instinctively teaches the
distinctions of right and wrong.”488 As illustrations, he recounted a foreign
case and a domestic case in which the defendants had been acquitted on the
ground of moral incapacity.489
485
Id. at 23 (“But it must always devolve on a jury to decide, under all the circumstances,
whether an unlawful act proceeded from insanity, or from the voluntary indulgence of evil
passions. For in some persons, the instinct of resentment, by being habitually cherished and
indulged, becomes a passion, which differs from insanity only in its duration.”) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). But see STEPHEN W. WILLIAMS, A CATECHISM OF MEDICAL
JURISPRUDENCE 180 (1835) (“Can the protection of insanity be allowed to a man who only
exhibits violent passions, and malignant resentments, who is impelled by no morbid
delusions, but who proceeds upon the ordinary perceptions of the mind? No.”).
486
ISAAC RAY, TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 98 (1838) (emphasis
added).
487
Id.
488
Id. at 100.
489
Id. at 101–03, 109–17 (referencing the second defendant’s “moral and intellectual
powers” after explaining that he chose very poor explanations for the murder and a
subsequent confession). In the American case, the defendant deliberately murdered his
employer’s wife, thinking that he could kill the husband also and would somehow inherit the
property. Id. at 112–13.
Ray criticized the moral incapacity test and advocated a new insanity excuse based on
then-current medical notions of insanity. Platt & Diamond, supra note 216, at 1250 (citing
ISAAC RAY, TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 13 (3d ed. 1853)). Ray
wished to reform insanity law and he proposed a comprehensive insanity statute. Regarding
the criminal liability of the insane, the proposed statute provided that “[i]nsane persons shall
not be made responsible for criminal acts” unless the prosecution proved that the act was
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Pre-M’naghten American Cases

Anthony Platt and Bernard Diamond documented that the American legal
system enshrined the moral incapacity test in infancy and insanity cases in
the early nineteenth century.490 Other early American cases, some before
1843 and some after, which frequently cited the English jurists and cases
discussed above, demonstrate that the “good and evil” or “right and wrong”
test as a staple of both insanity and infancy before M’Naghten’s Case
popularized its most famous formulation. Because the early English authors
discussed above adopted the moral incapacity test more distinctly concerning
infancy than they did concerning insanity,491 this section focuses on the
insanity excuse. To the extent that these cases did not hew closely to the moral
incapacity test, they adopted volitional tests or founded their tests on the
connection between cognition and volition, or they otherwise demonstrated
a commitment to a form of the insanity excuse that went beyond the
cognitive incapacity test or modern mens rea approach. None even
mentioned a purely cognitive approach of the type that would support the
modern mens rea approach, which they almost certainly would have done if
their purpose was to overturn an old test in favor of a new one. All of this
demonstrates that, from the birth of the United States until the late twentieth
century, the people and the legal system of this country believed that it took
more than cognitive capacity to be a moral agent worthy of society’s censure
and punishment.
a.

New York

Six New York trial court cases from the early nineteenth century
demonstrate that New York regularly employed the moral incapacity test in
cases to which it was relevant. In 1816, George Frederick Cooke was tried for
grand larceny for stealing a portrait.492 His attorney alleged insanity, the
primary proof being the attorney’s own “knowledge of physiognomy,” along
with the prisoner’s irrational method of attempting to turn a profit on the
portrait and his odd mannerisms on the witness stand.493 The court’s priceless
response was to tell the jury that “it is pretended, but not in evidence, that the
neither directly nor indirectly caused by the defendant’s insanity. PROJECT FOR A GENERAL
LAW FOR DETERMINING THE LEGAL RELATIONS OF THE INSANE § 12 (ISAAC RAY n.d.). It also
prohibited trying insane defendants during their insanity and required juries to specify
whether their verdicts were based on insanity. Id. at §§ 13 and 15.
490
Platt & Diamond, supra note 216, at 1238–46.
491
See supra Section IV.C.1.
492
George Frederick Cooke’s Case, 1 New York City-Hall Recorder 5, 5 (N.Y. Court of
Gen. Sess. 1816).
493
Id. at 6.

2020]

DUE PROCESS & THE INSANITY EXCUSE

93

prisoner is insane.”494 So instructed, the jury needed no explanation of the
insanity test and quickly found Cooke guilty.495
Isaac Truax was also tried for grand larceny in 1816, and he, too, raised the
insanity defense.496 He was well-to-do, and a friend’s testimony indicated that
after a good start in life, he had become an alcoholic.497 Constant intoxication
allegedly “impaired” his “senses” and “totally ruined” his “moral faculties,”
and he was therefore acquitted.498
Richard Clark was tried that same year for petty larceny, and he also raised
the insanity defense.499 Clark was a foreigner, and one of his few American
friends believed him insane, but many others who had interacted with him
thought he was of sound mind.500 The court nevertheless instructed the jury
on the insanity defense, saying that lunatics were responsible for crimes
committed when they were both lucid and could “distinguish[] good from
evil.”501 Although evidence of his eccentricities was introduced, none of the
testimony indicated that he did not understand the nature of money or the
concept of ownership and the court instructed the jury that “[t]he principal
subject of inquiry [is] . . . whether the prisoner, at the time he committed this
offence, had sufficient capacity to discern good from evil.”502 If the court had
adopted the mens rea approach, there would have been no reason to give an
insanity instruction, and the court would have essentially instructed the jury
to convict as it had done at Cooke’s trial.
Diana Sellick was also tried in 1816 but for murder.503 She tried to poison
Hetty Johnson by mixing rat poison with gin and offering it to her.504 Johnson
refused to drink any of the gin, so Sellick drank a small amount and gave
some to her own child.505 Johnson told Sellick not to give Johnson’s child any

494

Id.
Id.
496
Charles Mitchell, Lemuel H. Mitchell, and Isaac Truax’s Cases, 1 New York City-Hall
Recorder 41, 44–45 (N.Y. Court of Gen. Sess. 1816).
497
Id. at 45.
498
Id.
499
Richard P. Clark’s Case, 1 New York City-Hall Recorder 176, 176 (N.Y. Court of Gen.
Sess. 1816).
500
Id.
501
Id. at 177.
502
Id. at 176–77.
503
Diana Sellick’s Case, 1 New York City-Hall Recorder 185, 186–87 (N.Y. Court of Gen.
Sess. 1816).
504
Id.
505
Id. at 187.
495
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liquor, but Sellick did so anyway while Johnson was distracted.506 Both
children soon became ill, and Johnson’s child died a few days later.507 Johnson
testified that when Sellick found out the children were sick and that others
had discovered that she had bought poison earlier, she confessed she
intended to poison Johnson, but only because she, Sellick, was “possessed by
the devil.”508 Sellick’s old employer said she never saw anything to make her
believe that Sellick was insane.509 The judge reminded the jury that Sellick had
testified that she was “possessed [by] the devil, and knew not what she did.”510
But he refused to believe the defense had made a case for insanity and
essentially skipped the insanity instruction, telling the jury only that to
convict, they only need believe that the prisoner “wilfully and wickedly
perpetrated” the murder.511 That language is not conclusive but suggests
cognitive, moral, and volitional components. So does the judge’s conclusion,
after the verdict, that the evidence showed Sellick acted with “cunning
artifice.”512
John Ball was tried in 1817 for setting a home on fire.513 None of the
evidence raised any question of the defendant’s inability to understand the
nature of fire.514 Rebutting the argument that the evidence of a morally
reprehensible act was inherent evidence of insanity—which only makes sense
in the context of a moral incapacity or volitional incapacity excuse—the judge
instructed the jury to convict Ball if they were convinced he had set the fire
and that, “at the time he committed the offense, he was capable of
distinguishing good from evil[.]”515
Lawrence Pienovi was tried in 1818 for biting off part of his wife’s nose.516
Mr. Pienovi discovered that the good Mrs. Pienovi had a lover whose last
name was not Pienovi, and the indignant Mr. Pienovi committed the

506

Id.
Id.
508
Id.
509
Diana Sellick’s Case, 1 New York City-Hall Recorder 185, 188 (N.Y. Court of General
Sessions 1816).
510
Id. at 190.
511
Id. at 190–91.
512
Id. at 191.
513
John Ball’s Case, 2 New York City-Hall Recorder 85, 85 (N.Y. Court of Oyer and
Terminer 1817).
514
See id. at 85–86.
515
Id. at 86.
516
Lawrence Pienovi’s Case, 3 New York City-Hall Recorder 123, 123 (N.Y. Ct. of Gen.
Sess. 1818).
507
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forementioned act for revenge.517 Insanity was his only defense.518 His
employer testified that, after Mr. Pienovi discovered his wife’s affair, he
appeared very angry, “drank [water] to excess,” “frequently beat his head
against the wall during the night, and exhibited every other symptom of
derangement.”519 The next day he went out early and returned in the evening
with a “piece of flesh,” and “his conduct was so much like that of a madman,
that” his employer “took up a stick of wood for defence.”520 Three other
witnesses who knew Mr. Pienovi testified that they thought him “in some
degree deranged,”521 and several others confirmed or contradicted this
testimony.522 The prosecution and the court agreed that the relevant insanity
test was whether Mr. Pienovi could “distinguish good from evil.”523 The
court’s explanation resolves all doubt as to whether this language was used,
as Justice Kagan argued such language generally was, merely as an evidentiary
proxy for determining cognitive capacity: “[W]hen she raised her voice in
pain and agony, he went and closed the window shutters that she might not
be heard. Did he do this unconscious of guilt, not knowing the difference
between good and evil?”524
In 1822, Eliza Tripler was tried for the theft of five silver spoons.525
Although she produced evidence of no specific acts of insanity, she proved
that a “fall some years ago” had “affected her head.”526 Platt and Diamond
indicate that the court employed an insanity test that required the jury to
convict her if she showed the understanding of a fourteen-year-old child.527
Because the New York infancy excuse included a moral incapacity prong,528
Tripler indirectly supports the proposition that the moral incapacity excuse
was firmly established in New York.

517

Id. at 124.
Id.
519
Id. at 124–25.
520
Id. at 125.
521
Id. at 125–26.
522
Lawrence Pienovi’s Case, 3 New York City-Hall Recorder 123, 126 (N.Y. Ct. of Gen.
Sess. 1818).
523
Id.
524
Id. at 127.
525
People v. Tripler (N.Y. Ct. of Gen. Sess. 1822), in JACOB D. WHEELER, 1 REPORTS OF
CRIMINAL LAW CASES DECIDED AT THE CITY-HALL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 48 (1854).
526
Id. at 48–49.
527
Platt & Diamond, supra note 216, at 1260.
528
George Stage’s Case, 5 New York City-Hall Recorder 177, 178 (N.Y. Ct. of Gen. Sess.
1821) (employing the moral incapacity excuse for infancy).
518
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Thus, of seven early New York cases, four specifically and expressly
employed moral incapacity tests (Clark’s Case, Sellick’s Case, Ball’s Case, and
Pienovi’s Case). In the fifth, the defendant was acquitted because his “senses”
were “impaired” and his “moral faculties” were “totally ruined,” which
directly implies a moral incapacity excuse.529 In the sixth, the evidence of
insanity was so flimsy that the judge skipped the insanity test and instructed
the jury to convict. The seventh expressly tied the infancy and insanity
excuses together, indicating that both included moral incapacity prongs. By
the early nineteenth century, long before M’Naghten’s Case, New York courts
regularly employed the moral incapacity excuse in insanity cases.
b.

Delaware

Delaware adopted an insanity excuse that included cognitive and moral
prongs before M’Naghten’s Case. In State v. Dillahunt530 in 1840, the court
dealt with the insanity excuse. The defendant argued that he suffered from
mania a potu, or insanity as a result of refraining from alcohol after becoming
accustomed to constant drinking.531 Chief Justice Bayard instructed the jury
that the defendant would be guilty if he were able to “distinguish the nature
of actions” and “discern the difference between moral good and evil,” and
that the key question was whether the defendant “did . . . or did . . . not know
at the time he committed the act, that he was doing an immoral and unlawful
act.”532 The word “moral” strongly indicates that Bayard’s second prong, like
the statements of several of the writers discussed in the previous section,
referred to the moral faculty rather than the cognitive faculties. The
testimony of the doctors also focused on the ability to distinguish between
right and wrong.533

529
530
531
532
533

See supra note 498 and accompanying text.
State v. Dillahunt, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 551 (Ct. of Gen. Sess. 1840).
Id. at 552.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 552.
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New Jersey

New Jersey adopted the moral incapacity excuse for infancy before
M’Naghten.534 A lawyer’s argument in Den v. Vancleve535 in 1819 suggests the
same was true of the insanity defense. Vancleve involved a disputed will. One
of the lawyers argued that the deceased lacked the capacity to make a valid
will if he “could not distinguish between right and wrong or distributed his
property discreetly.”536 Jury instructions in a homicide case from 1846
unequivocally embraced the moral incapacity excuse, relying in part on
M’Naghten and in part on pre-1843 English cases.537
d.

Pennsylvania

In 1838, William Miller was tried for the murder of a peddler named
Solomon Huffman.538 Miller and Huffman stayed in the same room at a
tavern one night.539 Miller claimed that the tavernkeeper was his creditor and
he did not want the tavernkeeper to know he had money, so he offered to
purchase goods from Huffman the next morning on the road Huffman was
to take out of town.540 Miller met Huffman on the road the next morning,
murdered him, and took what he wanted.541 Miller was caught and brought
to trial, and his attorneys attempted to prove partial insanity by producing
the testimony of a phrenologist.542 The phrenologist testified that Miller’s
534
State v. Guild, 10 N.J.L. 163, 163 (1828); State v. Aaron, 4 N.J.L. 269, 276–77 (1818). In
Guild, the judge charged the jury as follows:
And at the age of this defendant [twelve and a half years old], sufficient
capacity is generally possessed in our state of society, by children of
ordinary understanding, and having the usual advantages of moral and
religious instruction. You will call to mind the evidence on this subject;
and if you are satisfied that he was able, in a good degree, to distinguish
right and wrong; to know the nature of the crime with which he is charged;
and that it was deserving of severe punishment, his infancy will furnish no
obstacle, on the score of incapacity, to his conviction.
Guild, 10 N.J.L. at 174.
535
Den v. Vancleve, 5 N.J.L. 695 (1819).
536
Id. at 791.
537
State v. Spencer, 21 N.J.L. 196, 201–13 (1846) (citations omitted).
538
ELLIS LEWIS, AN ABRIDGEMENT OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 399
(1848).
539
Id.
540
Id.
541
Id. at 399–400.
542
Id. at 400. Phrenologists, who gauged intelligence and mental characteristics by the
topography of the subject’s head, would never be allowed to give expert testimony today.
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“intellectual [and] moral faculties” were in good working order, but that his
“animal passions” were “deranged.”543 The court instructed the jury that if it
believed the prosecution’s evidence, it could acquit only on the ground of
insanity.544 The jury could acquit by reason of insanity if it “believed that the
prisoner was, at the time of committing the act charged, ‘incapable of judging
between right and wrong, and did not know that he was committing an
offence against the laws of God and man.’”545 The court further stated that, in
the case at hand, the only species of insanity supported by the evidence was
that of “moral insanity,” which was essentially an irresistible impulse
excuse.546 Pennsylvania appears to have adopted the English moral incapacity
excuse and added a volitional incapacity excuse based on compelling proof
of an irresistible impulse.
In dicta, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote in a civil case in 1846 that
an insane delusion must be connected with and result in the offense in order
to excuse the defendant from criminal liability.547 Considered by itself, this
formulation is almost as broad as the product-of-insanity test. Without citing
M’Naghten, the court that same year in a criminal case employed a volitional
incapacity test with moral incapacity overtones.548 By 1875, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court had adopted and persisted in using an insanity excuse with a
543
544
545
546

Id.
LEWIS, supra note 538, at 400.
Id. at 401 (quoting the judge’s instruction).
Id. The court explained as follows:
But (continued the court) if any insanity exists in this case, it is of that
description denominated MORAL INSANITY. This arises from the existence
of some of the natural propensities in such violence, that it is impossible not
to yield to them. It bears a striking resemblance to vice, which is said to
consist in “an undue excitement of the passions and will, and in their
irregular or crooked actions leading to crime.” It is therefore to be received
with the utmost scrutiny. It is not generally admitted in legal tribunals as
a species of insanity which relieves from responsibility for crime, and it
ought never to be admitted as a defence until it is shown that these
propensities exist in such violence as to subjugate the intellect, control the
will, and render it impossible for the party to do otherwise than yield.
Where its existence is fully established, this species of insanity, like every
other, relieves from accountability to human laws. But this state of mind is
not to be presumed without evidence; nor does it usually occur without
some premonitory symptoms indicating its approach.

Id.
547

M’Elroy’s Case, 6 Watts & Serg. 451, 456 (Pa. 1843).
Commonwealth v. Mosler, 4 Pa. 264, 267 (1846) (“But there is a moral or homicidal
insanity, consisting of an irresistible inclination to kill, or to commit some other particular
offense.”).
548
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clear moral incapacity prong and also seemed to adopt a volitional incapacity
prong.549
e.

Virginia

In a Virginia murder trial in the late 1830s, the judge charged the jury on
an insanity excuse containing both pure and legal-moral incapacity.550 The
jury could acquit on the basis of insanity only if the evidence showed the
defendant was “incapable, in consequence of insanity either partial or
general, of judging between right and wrong or good and evil, and that at the
time he committed the act he did not consider it a crime, an act evil in itself
or forbidden by the laws of the land.”551 If the jury based its conclusion on
partial insanity, it must find that the defendant suffered from a delusion that
made the prisoner believe “that the act . . . was justifiable.”552
f.

Connecticut

Pre-M’Naghten Connecticut decisions followed Blackstone in holding that
infants and the insane were not held responsible because “the will must
concur with the act.”553 A child of fourteen—the same age at which the
common law presumed a person responsible as an adult—could be held liable
for “malicious words” because, at that time period, “at the age of fourteen the
law presumes the human mind has acquired a complete sense of right and
wrong.”554 Therefore, it would seem that Connecticut founded its insanity
defense, like its infancy defense, in part on the moral incapacity excuse. It was
founded, at the very least, on a defect of will resulting from a defect of
cognition. Statements like this may show that if it were not for evidentiary
concerns and old ideas of volition and sin, American courts would have
widely adopted a separate volitional incapacity defense.
549

Ortwein v. Commonwealth, 76 Pa. 414, 424–25 (1875) (citing jury instructions from
an early case, which in turn cited an abridgment of United States criminal law). General
insanity was not an excuse unless it was “so great in its extent or degree as to blind him to the
nature and consequences of his moral duty.” Id. at 424. “[G]eneral insanity” had to “be so
great as entirely to destroy his perception of right and wrong.” Id. “It must amount to
delusion or hallucination controlling his will, making the commission of the act, in his
apprehension, a duty of overruling necessity.” Id. at 425. The insanity must have been “so
great as to have controlled the will of its subject and to have taken from him the freedom of
moral action.” Id.
550
Gwatkin v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. (9 Leigh) 678, 678-80 (1839).
551
Id. at 679.
552
Id. at 679–80.
553
Myers v. State, 1 Conn. 502, 505 (1816) (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 205, at *20,
*24).
554
See Sterling v. Adams, 3 Day 411, 426–27 (Conn. 1809) (citing an unknown source).
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Georgia

In Roberts v. State in 1847, the Georgia Supreme Court discussed jury
instructions on the insanity defense.555 The instructions, with which the court
did not find fault, embodied a clear moral incapacity test. The judge
instructed the jury that the defendant must be convicted if he had enough
mental power “to enable him to distinguish between right and wrong in
regard to the particular act about to be committed, to know and understand
that it would be wrong, and that he would deserve punishment by
committing it.”556 The court cited English and American authorities but did
not rely on or cite M’Naghten.557 In particular, for its statement of the moral
incapacity test, the Roberts court cited Joseph Chitty’s Medical Jurisprudence,
Shelford’s treatise on lunacy, Rex v. Ferrers, Rex v. Arnold, Parker’s Case, Rex
v. Offord, and Commonwealth v. Rogers.558 It also cited Hadfield’s Case at
length and argued in some detail that the case depended on the volitional
incapacity excuse.559 The justices of the Georgia Supreme Court seemed to
believe that the moral incapacity test had been around a long time in AngloAmerican law and was the quintessential insanity excuse,560 but the specific
test given to the jury depended upon the specific facts of the case because not
all cases called for a full explanation of the insanity excuse.561

555

Roberts v. State, 3 Ga. 310, 326–27 (1847).
Id. at 327.
557
Id. at passim.
558
Id. at 330.
559
Id. at 330–32 (citations omitted). The Roberts court explained the insanity excuse
relied on in Hadfield’s Case as follows:
Now, in this case, it was not pretended that Hadsfield [sic] was a raving
madman, or an imbecile idiot; nor was it contended that he was incapable
of knowing that shooting a pistol at the king, would, or might kill him, or
that if he should kill the king, that he would deserve death for the act; (for
that really was what he desired,) or that he was incapable of distinguishing
between the right and the wrong of the act; but it was contended, that the
delusion under which he laboured had so shattered his intellect, as to
control his will, and impel him resistlessly to the commission of the act,
and therefore there was no criminal motive, no wicked or mischievous
intent, and if these were wanting, he was irresponsible.
Id. at 331.
560
Roberts, 3 Ga. at 327–33.
561
Id. at 332 (citations omitted).
556

2020]

DUE PROCESS & THE INSANITY EXCUSE
h.

101

Massachusetts

Homer Crotty asserted that Commonwealth v. Rogers562 in 1844 was the
earliest definitive American case on the moral incapacity excuse,563 but the
excuse was in use in Massachusetts long before. The court reporter for an
1810 Massachusetts murder trial reported in the New York City-Hall
Recorder stated that the test for insanity, which the defense raised, was the
ability to “distinguish[] good from evil.”564 Rogers, for its part, employed the
moral incapacity excuse—including pure moral and legal-moral
components—in reliance on M’Naghten’s Case, four older English cases, and
two legal treatises.565
i.

Tennessee

Tennessee defined murder with Coke’s definition: “murder is where a
person of sound mind and discretion, unlawfully killeth any reasonable
creature . . . with malice aforethought.”566 Discretion, as argued above,
signifies far more than mere cognitive capacity.567 The prior history of an
1806 Tennessee murder case indicated that the accused’s ten-year-old
brother was disqualified as a witness.568 He did not have “sufficient discretion
to be sworn” because “he had not any sense of the obligation of an oath.”569
“So far from this child having discretion, it is directly the reverse.”570 This is
a clear affirmation that early Anglo-American courts understood discretion
to include moral capacity.
Furthermore, in that same case, a young teenager was acquitted of murder
through the infancy excuse even though the evidence showed insanity rather

562

Commonwealth v. Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 500 (1844).
Crotty, supra note 236, at 121 (citation omitted).
564
Commonwealth v. Meriam, 6 New York City-Hall Recorder 162 (Mass. 1810). The
report contained in the Massachusetts reporter is not as detailed as the report contained in
Roger’s New York City-Hall reporter.
565
Rogers, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) at 501–02, 502 n. (citations omitted).
566
State v. Seaborne, 8 Rob. 518, 523 (La. 1843) (citing a Tennessee case without
indicating the case name or year); supra note 223 and accompanying text; see Jacob v. State,
22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 493, 495 (1842) (“Murder at common law, as described by Lord Coke, is
where a person of sound memory and discretion, unlawfully killeth any reasonable creature
in being, and under the peace of the State, with malice aforethought, either express or
implied.”).
567
Supra Section IV.C.1.iv (Anthony Fitzherbert).
568
State v. Doherty, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 79 (1806).
569
Id.
570
Id.
563
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than a lack of mental development due to age.571 The judge instructed the jury
that persons over fourteen years old were “doli capax,” but between the ages
of seven and fourteen were presumed incapable of “disern[ing] between right
and wrong.”572 “But this presumption is removed, if from the circumstances
it appears that the person discovered a consciousness of wrong.”573 She had
apparently feigned insanity so well that none of the judges or members of the
jury, or even many spectators who had attended the trial, had questioned that
“she had literally lost her understanding, if not her speech. Several hundreds,
if not thousands, particularly examined her from time to time, and none
discovered the deception.”574 It was essentially an insanity verdict, and the
case demonstrates that, as far as the moral incapacity prong goes, the infancy
and insanity excuses differed only according to the age of the defendant, the
presumption of capacity or incapacity, and the burden of proof.
Twenty years later, Burrell Cornwell was tried and convicted of murder.575
He attempted to prove that the use of “ardent spirits . . . produced partial
insanity.”576 Insanity could only be a ground for his acquittal if it was not the
result of the defendant deliberately becoming intoxicated.577 The court
instructed the jury that the defendant was not responsible if he “had not
sufficient understanding to distinguish right from wrong, and was in a state
of insanity.”578
j.

Ohio
579

In Clark v. State, the defense produced a medical expert who testified
that the defendant was insane.580 On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked
the doctor whether he believed the defendant was “incapable of
distinguishing right from wrong.”581 This language was not merely a proxy
for questioning the doctor about the defendant’s cognitive capacity, because
571

Id. at 80, 88.
Id. at 88.
573
Id.
574
State v. Doherty, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) at 89. The deception was not uncovered until after
the trial. Immediate after the verdict, she resumed acting normally.
575
Cornwell v. State, 8 Tenn. (Mart. & Yer.) 147, 147, 149 (1827).
576
Id. at 148.
577
Id. at 148–49.
578
Id.
579
Clark v. State, 12 Ohio 483 (1843) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Kelch v.
State, 45 N.E. 6 (Ohio 1896) (holding a different proof requirement was appropriate in
insanity cases).
580
Id. at 484.
581
Id.
572
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the prosecutor then asked whether the doctor believed the defendant
“would . . . have known that it was wrong to commit murder,” then whether
he “would . . . have known that it was wrong to commit arson, rape, or
burglary.”582 The defense objected to these questions as irrelevant, but the
trial court held they were relevant and admitted them, and the Ohio Supreme
Court affirmed.583 The jury instructions in Clark embodied the moral
incapacity excuse.584
Three Ohio cases from the early 1830s dealt with insanity.585 Wallace v.
Bevard was a civil case, and the report shines no light on the substance of the
Ohio insanity excuse.586 State v. Gardiner contained a jury instruction on
cognitive capacity as part of the definition of premeditated murder, but no
definition of the insanity excuse.587 State v. Thompson included a jury charge
on moral incapacity.588
In Walton v. State589, the Ohio Supreme Court considered the proper
interpretation of the Ohio murder and manslaughter statute in relation to the
intoxication excuse.590 At oral argument, the defendant’s attorney argued that
intoxication severe enough to prevent “deliberation” was a valid excuse to
first-degree murder because the statute required deliberation, without any
qualification or restriction on the kinds of causes that could prevent the
mental state of deliberation.591 If intoxication caused the defendant to be
unable to deliberate on the killing before putting his plan into action, the
offense would be reduced to manslaughter.592 However, the defendant could
not even form malice if he was so intoxicated that he was “totally deprive[d]
the party of reason, so that he has no faculty to distinguish the nature of
actions, to discern the difference between moral good and evil.”593 The
582

Id. at 485.
Id. at 485–86, 494.
584
Id. at 494 n.a (“Was he, at the time the act was committed, capable of judging whether
that act was right or wrong? [A]nd did he know at the time that it was an offence against the
laws of God and man?”).
585
John K. McHenry, The Judicial Evolution of Ohio’s Insanity Defense, 13 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 49, 57 & n.70 (1987) (citing State v. Thompson, 1 Wright 617 (Ohio 1834); State v.
Gardiner, 1 Wright 392 (Ohio 1833); Wallace v. Bevard, 1 Wright 114 (Ohio 1832)).
586
Wallace, 1 Wright at 114.
587
Gardiner, 1 Wright at 399–402.
588
Thompson, 1 Wright at 620, 622.
589
Walton v. State, 10 Ohio Dec. Reprint 256 (1843).
590
Id. at 256–57.
591
Id. at 257–58.
592
Id.
593
Id. at 258.
583
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punctuation renders the statement ambiguous, but it is best read as setting
forth two prongs of the intoxication excuse—one cognitive, one moral. That
interpretation is consistent with Clark and with the nature of reports of oral
remarks. It is also consistent with the all-important word “moral” and the
logical progression of the sentence.
k.

Alabama

Alabama laid out its insanity defense in State v. Marler594 in 1841. The
question was the insanity excuse’s burden of proof.595 The Marler court
approved the strong statements in Rex v. Arnold, which adopted the wild
beast test, and Bellingham’s Case, which adopted the moral incapacity excuse
and demanded “the most distinct and unquestionable evidence” to prove
insanity “beyond all doubt.”596 Both tests, which the court said were
“undoubted law,”597 included the moral incapacity component and were
indisputably broader than the modern cognitive incapacity test as embodied
in the mens rea approach.598
l.

Federal Cases

Michael Clarke shot his wife one day when she came back from church.599
He was tried in 1818, and the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
instructed the jury, based on evidence that his constant recourse to the bottle
had “disordered” his “body and mind,” that they were to acquit him if they
found him, by reason of insanity, “not to have been conscious of the moral
turpitude of the act.”600 In United States v. Cornell,601 the defendant raised the
insanity excuse on the basis of inadequate education and greater than average
“ignoran[ce]” and “stupid[ity].”602 The defendant’s attorney “explicitly
abandoned” the insanity excuse because all the evidence showed that “he was
compos mentis, having intelligence to discern what was right and what was
wrong.”603

594

State v. Marler, 2 Ala. 43 (1841).
Id. at 47–48. Later decisions called into question Marler’s contradictory statements on
the burden of proof. E.g., Boswell v. State, 63 Ala. 307, 322–23 (1879).
596
Marler, 2 Ala. at 48 (citations omitted).
597
Id.
598
Supra Sections IV.C.2.i (Rex v. Arnold) and IV.C.2.vi (Bellingham’s Case).
599
United States v. Clarke, 25 F. Cas. 454, 454 (C.C.D.C. 1818) (No. 14,811).
600
Id.
601
United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 650 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820) (No. 14,868).
602
Id. at 657.
603
Id.
595
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In an 1820 case, a creditor sued a sheriff for the loss incurred when an
indebted person became insane and violated his bond condition of remaining
in prison.604 The sheriff defended by alleging the escapee’s insanity as an
excuse to a bond violation.605 The court reasoned that the bond, which
required the debtor to “faithfully and absolutely ‘remain within the limits of
the jail-yard . . . until he be lawfully discharged,’”606 could “be observed only
by a rational being, who can discriminate between fidelity and a violation of
duty” and who had “a sense of right and wrong.”607 The obligation of the bond
could not “continue after the extinction of the moral sense.”608
In 1828, Alexander Drew, a ship captain, was tried for the murder of his
second mate.609 Drew, a man of no small accomplishments in the intoxication
department, had all the alcohol dropped into the ocean.610 After five days, he
became delusional.611 He thought his crew would kill him and “complained
of persons, who were unseen, talking to him, and urging him to kill Clark.”612
The prosecutor admitted he could not win unless the court held that insanity
caused by excessive alcoholism—but not the immediate result of
intoxication—was not an excuse.613 The court held it was a defense, and Drew
was acquitted, even though the testimony clearly showed he knew he was
killing the second mate.614
In early 1835, Richard Lawrence tried to assassinate President Andrew
Jackson.615 “The assault with intent to kill was proved by the clearest possible
evidence,”616 but it was subsequently discovered that Lawrence believed he
was the king of England.617 Believing, further, that America was still part of
England, he took it upon himself to kill the President.618 The prosecutor
conceded that Hadfield’s Case contained the proper insanity test, and within

604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612
613
614
615
616
617
618

Hazard v. Hazard, 11 F. Cas. 925, 925 (C.C.D. Vt. 1820) (No. 6278).
Id.
Id. (citing the language of the bond).
Id. at 926.
Id.
United States v. Drew, 25 F. Cas. 913, 913 (C.C.D. Mass. 1828) (No. 14,993).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 913-14.
United States v. Lawrence, 26 F. Cas. 887, 887 (C.C.D.C. 1835) (No. 15,577).
Id.
Id. at 891.
Id.
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five minutes the jury acquitted Lawrence on the ground of insanity619—a
verdict only possible if the insanity excuse included moral incapacity.
m.

Summary

New York, Massachusetts, Tennessee, Ohio, and Alabama cases
demonstrate that the moral incapacity excuse was established in those states
in the early nineteenth century. Federal courts also employed the moral
incapacity excuse in the early nineteenth century. Infancy and civil cases
before 1843, and criminal cases afterward, showed that the same was true of
Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Georgia.
6.

Post-M’Naghten American Practice

American practice after 1843 is documented much more thoroughly
elsewhere620 but deserves a summary here. American authorities and cases
demonstrate that the moral incapacity excuse was firmly established in the
American legal system well before M’Naghten’s Case in 1843, and American
practice post-M’Naghten shows that, although not every state retained the
moral incapacity test at all times, the insanity excuse remained broader than
cognitive incapacity in every state until the mid-1900s. Early twentiethcentury attempts to adopt the mens rea approach were struck down by state
courts. Before Idaho, Utah, Nevada, and Kansas adopted mens rea
legislation—the very states whose legislation is in question—no state had
successfully implemented the mens rea approach.
After M’Naghten, the dual cognitive-moral incapacity formulation took
American courts by storm.621 Some states added the volitional incapacity
excuse or replaced the moral incapacity excuse altogether.622 New Hampshire
adopted the product-of-insanity test described above.623 The District of
Columbia temporarily adopted the Durham test, which is closely related to
the product-of-insanity test.624 Fourteen states have adopted the Model Penal

619

Id.
See e.g., McHenry, supra note 585, at 65–77; Janet A. Tighe, Francis Wharton and the
Nineteenth-Century Insanity Defense: The Origins of a Reform Tradition, 27 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 223 (1983); Doug B. Abrams, Comment, The Insanity Defense in North Carolina, 14
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1157 (1978); Trent Echard, Comment, Clark v. Arizona: Has the Court
Painted Itself into a Corner?, 1 PHOENIX L. REV. 213, 224–26 (2008).
621
Platt & Diamond, supra note 216, at 1257 (citations omitted).
622
Id.
623
Supra note 42.
624
Supra note 42.
620
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Code’s insanity excuse, which includes moral and volitional incapacity
prongs.625
In the early twentieth century, Washington and Mississippi tried to
abolish the insanity defense in favor of the mens rea approach, but the high
courts of both states stepped in and struck down the changes.626 Montana
adopted the mens rea approach in 1979, and Utah, Kansas, Nevada, and
Idaho did the same over the next two decades.627 In 1982, Alaska abolished
the moral incapacity excuse and made cognitive incapacity an affirmative
defense.628 The Nevada Supreme Court struck down its state’s statute,629 but
the other states’ laws survived state-court challenges.630 Based on the United
States Supreme Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence and the
historical evidence presented in this article, the Court has clear historicolegal grounds for striking down these statutes.
D.

Objections

Having made the historical case, three major objections to this article’s
argument deserve attention. One is theoretical, and two others, practical. The
lack of a uniform insanity excuse, the practical difficulties of applying the
broad principle articulated here, and the nature of our form of government
might cause some to hesitate before accepting my thesis.
1.

Lack of a Uniform Insanity Excuse

First, the historical evidence does not show that a particular insanity
excuse—let alone a particular formulation of it—satisfies the rigorous
“historically rooted” standard. Although it is true the history shows that no
single test or formulation can attain the status of a Due Process right, the
history shows a principle fundamentally rooted in the American tradition
and conscience: cognitive capacity is not the only mental prerequisite to
moral fault and criminal responsibility. That principle, although it does not
guarantee the moral incapacity excuse to every defendant, does require more

625

Model Penal Code § 4.01 (AM. LAW INST., 1962).
Sinclair v. State, 132 So. 581, 582 (Miss. 1931) (per curiam) (relying in part on federal
due process arguments); State v. Strasburg, 110 P. 1020, 1025 (Wash. 1920) (en banc)
(relying on state constitutional grounds).
627
Supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
628
ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010 (2020); State v. Patterson, 740 P.2d 944, 945, 949 (Alaska
1987); Hart v. State, 702 P.2d 651, 657 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (citations omitted).
629
Finger v. State, 27 P.3d 66, 68 (Nev. 2001).
630
State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 919 (Idaho 1990); State v. Bethel, 66 P.3d 840, 851–52
(Kan. 2003); State v. Korell, 690 P.2d 992, 1002 (Mont. 1984); State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359,
366–67 (Utah 1995).
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than the cognitive incapacity excuse and would have been enough for the
Court to strike down Kansas’s statute.
2.

Lack of Specific Guidance

The broad rule articulated in this article provides little guidance to the
states. Kansas, Idaho, Utah, Montana, and Alaska would have to revisit their
insanity excuses, but how could they be sure that a new, narrowly drawn
insanity excuse would meet the Supreme Court’s requirements? Attempts to
rewrite the statutes as narrowly as possible could lead to new and more
nuanced questions based on the voluminous but difficult to interpret
historical record. The answer is that any insanity excuse that is broader than
the mens rea approach is acceptable. The states must have the cognitive
incapacity excuse and a formulation of at least one of the other insanity tests,
including the product-of-insanity test, the moral incapacity test, or the
volitional incapacity test.
3.

Incompatibility with Our Form of Government

Others might be concerned about preserving federalism and curbing
judicial activism. Justice Thomas and the Federalist Society are not the only
ones who share this concern—the Supreme Court’s own Due Process
insanity jurisprudence’s oft-repeated theme is the right of state legislatures to
define crimes and defenses without federal interference.631 Additionally, the
substantive due process doctrine is troubling because it violates the principle
of rule by the people through their elected representatives632 and creates a
prime opportunity for judges to be swayed by their historical and moral
views.633 I fully concur with these objections, but they have not led the
631

See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 752 (2006) (“With this varied background, it
is clear that no particular formulation has evolved into a baseline for due process, and that
the insanity rule, like the conceptualization of criminal offenses, is substantially open to state
choice.”); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 792, 799 (1952). Louis J. Capozzi III raised similar
concerns and argued for the benefits of federalism in a recent article on appointed counsel
for indigent defendants in misdemeanor cases. Louis J. Capozzi III, Sixth Amendment
Federalism, 43 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 645, 695–96, 713–15, 719 (2020). Judge Jeffrey
Sutton’s recent book argues at length for the benefits of federalism and shows that the federal
government and its highest organs, including the Supreme Court, cannot always be relied
upon to protect individual rights and our common values. See generally SUTTON, supra note
14.
632
Supra note 18.
633
See Christian B. Sundquist, Genetics, Race and Substantive Due Process, 20 WASH. &
LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 341, 389–90 (2014) (citations omitted); Sandefer, supra note 18,
at 148, 157–59; Charles B. Blackmar, Essay, Neutral Principles and Substantive Due Process,
35 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 511, 512 (1991) (“I reached my conclusion on the basis that the statute, as
applied to this driver, simply did not sound right to me.”).
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Supreme Court to overturn its substantive Due Process jurisprudence. As a
historico-legal argument, this article is only relevant if the Supreme Court
continues to make substantive due process decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
Until the late twentieth century, the Anglo-American legal system
consistently and without exception demonstrated its commitment to the
principle that cognitive capacity, by itself, is not sufficient to make a person
criminally responsible. The early English writers embraced the cognitive and
moral incapacity tests because they and their fellow English citizens believed
that the power to make a meaningful choice depended on the power to
understand. The early English cases employed moral incapacity tests—
sometimes pure moral incapacity, sometimes moral-legal incapacity, and
sometimes both, but always at least one or the other. Later English writers
and early American writers took up the task of summarizing and analyzing
the law, and they regularly included the moral incapacity excuse in their
discussions of the criminal law. Pre-M’Naghten American cases demonstrate
that the moral incapacity excuse was in use in America long before
M’Naghten’s Case made a single formulation so popular. Subsequent
American practice diverged somewhat from the moral incapacity excuse but
never shrunk to the cognitive incapacity test alone until the late twentieth
century.
The Supreme Court should recognize that if there was ever a principle
firmly rooted in the tradition and conscience of the American people, it is the
core principle that lurks behind the Anglo-American views on moral fault
and criminal responsibility: a person cannot be criminally responsible unless
that person’s inner being is capable, at a minimum, of something more than
merely understanding the nature of the person’s acts. Although the
“something more” should be left to the people of each state to decide, the core
principle is enshrined in the hearts and minds of the people of the whole
country and in courtrooms across the nation. It is high time the Supreme
Court enshrined it in the jurisprudence of our highest tribunal.

